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THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME 
ROBERT LEIDER* 
Two visions of American criminal law have emerged. The first vision is 
that criminal law is statutory and posits that legislatures, not courts, draft 
substantive criminal law. The second vision, like the first, begins with 
legislative supremacy, but it ends with democratic dysfunction. On this view, 
while contemporary American criminal law is statutory in theory, in practice, 
American legislatures badly draft and maintain criminal codes. This 
effectively delegates the “real” drafting of criminal law to prosecutors, who 
form the law through their charging decisions. 
This Article offers a third vision: that modern American criminal law is 
primarily conventional. That is, much of our criminal law is defined by 
unwritten common-law-like norms that are widely acknowledged and 
generally respected, and yet are not recognized as formal law enforceable in 
courts. This Article makes three contributions. First, it argues that criminal 
law conventions exist. Second, it explains how nonlegal checks on 
prosecutorial power bring about criminal law conventions. Third, it provides 
an account for how legislatures and courts should respond to a criminal law 
heavily comprised of norms that rely primarily on nonlegal sanctions for 
their enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two visions of contemporary American criminal law have emerged. 
The first vision, often recited by judges, is that criminal law has become 
statutory.1 Proponents of this opinion observe that federal courts do not have 
jurisdiction over common law criminal prosecutions,2 and that a 
supermajority of states have abolished common law crimes.3 Instead, 
legislatures now decide which conduct is permissible and which is 
prohibited. In theory, this is a good thing. Only by making criminal law 
statutory can the criminal law comport with basic principles of legality.4 The 
people’s representatives decide what should be criminalized, and individuals 
have notice that the government has prohibited certain conduct. 
The second vision, more common in academic circles, contends that 
modern criminal law has devolved into the “law” of prosecutorial discretion. 
Adherents to this vision argue that contemporary legislatures badly draft and 
maintain criminal codes. Legislatures enact too many laws.5 Congress, in 
particular, has created a federal criminal law that duplicates state criminal 
codes.6 State and federal laws are often too broad, criminalizing actions that 
should be lawful.7 Worse still, the statutes are often vague, making it difficult 
 
 1 Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(a) (3d ed. 2017); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law 
Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 971–72, 972 nn.17 & 19 (2019) [hereinafter Hessick, Myth] 
(collecting authority for the claim and ultimately arguing against it); Kevin C. McMunigal, A 
Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285, 1287 (2004) (“The dominant 
attitude expressed in American jurisdictions is one of legislative supremacy and exclusivity.”); 
John W. Poulos, The Judicial Process and Substantive Criminal Law: The Legacy of Roger 
Traynor, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 429, 432 (1996) (“Statutes have always played a significant 
role in American criminal law. Hence, we gradually developed a preference for statutory 
criminal law.”). 
 2 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812). Perhaps erroneously, this case now 
stands for the proposition that “[t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is 
entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures 
of statute.” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985). But Hudson did not rule out 
Congress passing a statute conferring jurisdiction on federal courts over common law crimes. 
 3 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 980–83 (surveying states). 
 4 Id. at 971–98 (describing the conventional view). 
 5 See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 263 
(2001); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717, 744–45 (1996). 
 6 See Stephen F. Smith, Federalization’s Folly, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 35 (2019) 
[hereinafter Smith, Folly]. 
 7 Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 360 (2019); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506–07 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]. 
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to tell what conduct is criminal.8 If breadth and vagueness were not bad 
enough, legislatures hesitate to repeal or amend crimes that have become 
desuetudinal or are rarely enforced.9 Combined, proponents argue that these 
problems leave us with a criminal justice system that suffers from vast over-
criminalization. In modern America, everyone commits “three felonies a 
day.”10 
According to the adherents of this view, these legislative defects provide 
prosecutors with plenary power over the administration of criminal justice.11 
Because modern criminal law is so broad, prosecutors are delegated the 
power to decide who to charge and with which crimes.12 Even where a person 
has clearly violated the law, prosecutors have absolute discretion to select 
which crimes to charge, and that selection has an enormous impact on the 
defendant’s ultimate sentence.13 Conversely, defendants have little power. 
Most constitutional rights designed to protect defendants against the 
government are trial rights, and few people today go to trial.14 Prosecutors 
have too many crimes to prosecute, while most defendants are guilty of some 
wrongdoing.15 So, prosecutors offer defendants lower sentences in exchange 
for guilty pleas. Defendants who refuse and go to trial face a massive trial 
penalty if they are convicted.16 Faced with offers they cannot refuse,17 
 
 8 Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 360. 
 9 Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 
532, 533 (1970); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal 
Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1333–34 (2008). 
 10 HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT 
(2011). 
 11 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 579–80 (“Enforcement discretion permits 
overcriminalization, which in turns encourages more discretion. The result is an unwritten 
criminal ‘law’ that consists only of enforcers’ discretionary decisions.”). 
 12 Id. at 506, 509. 
 13 Griffin, supra note 5, at 273. 
 14 See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1071, 1073–74 (2017); Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
1071, 1074–75, 1080–81 (2019). 
 15 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1970); NEIL M. GORSUCH, JANE 
NITZE & DAVID FEDER, A REPUBLIC IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 242–43 (2019); Carolyn B. Ramsey, 
The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1309, 1332 (2002). 
 16 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 6 (2018); Josh Bowers, 
Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664 (2017) [hereinafter Bowers, Juries]. 
 17 See Clark Neily, Jury Empowerment as an Antidote to Coercive Plea Bargaining, 31 
FED. SENT’G REP. 284, 286–90 (2019). 
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defendants almost always plead guilty.18 Trials are for the reckless, the 
mentally ill, and the innocent—and sometimes even the innocent plead guilty 
because the risks are so high or because they wish to escape pretrial 
detention.19 Courts have held that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
a core executive power, almost entirely unreviewable by judges.20 In essence, 
criminal law today is contract law between prosecutors and defendants, who 
have vastly unequal bargaining power.21 One author laments that “our current 
system of judicial passivity, legislative delegation, and prosecutorial 
supremacy” is worse than the common law system it replaced.22 
American criminal law scholars do not universally subscribe to either 
of these visions. Some have pushed back on the claims that criminal law is 
purely statutory.23 These scholars argue that the common law remains an 
important part of our substantive criminal law and that vague statutes 
function as delegations to judges to define the scope of criminal law.24 Some 
scholars have also pushed back on claims that prosecutors possess unfettered 
discretion, arguing that various institutional constraints curb prosecutors’ de 
facto power.25 But these recent articles have not provided a comprehensive 
account of how checks and balances turn statutory criminal law into a de 
facto common law system. 
This Article articulates that vision of substantive criminal law. I argue 
that the structure of criminal law comprises not just statutory and formal 
common law, but also “conventions.” Conventions are unwritten norms and 
 
 18 John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who 
Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2F1Qxn7 
[https://perma.cc/6TE3-4H9H]. 
 19 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59 
(2011); John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent 
Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 173 (2014); Jeffery Q. Smith & 
Grant R. Macqueen, Trials Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?, 
101 JUDICATURE 27, 34 (2017). 
 20 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Griffin, supra note 5, at 275; 
Rebecca Krauss, Prosecutorial Discretion, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal 
Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4–7 (2009); Misner, supra note 
5, at 736. For those few areas in which courts will review acts of prosecutorial discretion, see 
Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1365, 1370–72 (1987). 
 21 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1968 (1992). 
 22 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 971; see also Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 359. 
 23 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 968; Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal 
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996). 
 24 See, e.g., Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 978–79; Kahan, supra note 23, at 473–74. 
 25 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019) [hereinafter 
Bellin, Power of Prosecutors]; infra note 27. 
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customs that are not “law” in the strict sense but nevertheless act as 
obligatory rules.26 Unlike formal common law, which is enforceable in 
courts, conventions are binding only through indirect means, such as political 
pressure. But even though conventions may not bind legal actors in a court 
of law, conventions cannot be reduced to exercises of mere prosecutorial 
discretion. 
How did we end up with a conventional criminal law? This Article 
argues that our current system is a product of checks and balances. Darryl 
Brown and Daniel Richman have explained how some democratic separation 
of powers checks work to constrain prosecutors’ discretion.27 Even if 
statutory criminal law is overbroad, legislatures curtail the scope of criminal 
law through legislative reform, budgetary decisions, and oversight.28 Courts 
occasionally curtail the scope of broadly drafted statutes by employing the 
rule of lenity or void for vagueness doctrines. And executive officials are 
accountable to the electorate and incentivized not to enforce criminal statutes 
when such enforcement would be unpopular with voters.29 The checks they 
identify constrain prosecutors’ discretion to prosecute conduct that society 
views as blameless, and they form part of my account, too. In addition, I 
argue that legislatures and judges have various soft-power tools to constrain 
prosecutors and that juries—or at least the threat of jury trials—heavily cabin 
which charges prosecutors bring. Prosecutors who violate these norms by 
prosecuting blameless conduct will struggle to secure a conviction, 
regardless of the defendant’s technical legal guilt. Further, checks and 
balances constrain prosecutorial discretion by reducing prosecutors’ ability 
to show excessive leniency. For example, prosecutors are accountable to 
voters, and federal overcriminalization allows federal prosecutors to compete 
with local prosecutors. These checks, along with others, reinforce the 
pressure to maintain the proper scope of criminal law against prosecutors 
inclined to decriminalize too much. 
Finally, this Article explains how legislatures and courts should 
accommodate the existence of criminal law conventions. The existence of 
conventions poses a difficult challenge for legal actors because, although 
 
 26 See infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text. 
 27 Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 256 (2007) 
[hereinafter Brown, Democracy]; Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between 
Federal and Local Law Enforcement, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000 81, 91–96 (2000) 
[hereinafter Richman, Changing Boundaries]. 
 28 Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 256; Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, 
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789–93 
(1999) [hereinafter Richman, Federal Criminal Law]. 
 29 Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 256–65; Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra 
note 28, at 789–93. 
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conventions are mandatory in some political sense, they are not formal law 
recognized by the legal system. Yet, this does not mean that courts, 
legislatures, and executive branch officials should ignore their existence. The 
forces that produce criminal law conventions provide a necessary check on 
prosecutorial discretion; their existence prevents criminal law from 
devolving into the prosecutor’s private preferences about what should be 
unlawful. Given this, all three branches of government have a responsibility 
to facilitate the political, public, and private sanctions that are essential to 
maintaining a conventional system. In fact, the need for formal legal actors 
to support conventions is especially acute in criminal law, where occasional 
deviations from public conventions are often not publicized widely and 
prejudice unsympathetic or marginalized defendants. 
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I argue against the two 
contemporary visions of criminal law. The first is that criminal law is 
statutory, while the second contends that, due to rampant 
overcriminalization, it has devolved into prosecutorial discretion. I argue that 
neither account is an accurate description of our current criminal law system. 
The statutory model has well-known shortcomings: Legislatures pass broad, 
vague, and overlapping laws, effectively delegating much of the criminal law 
to prosecutors. In addition, much criminal law remains common law, 
including the definitions of inchoate crimes, causation, and defenses. Even 
when legislatures purport to define these aspects of the law, they leave 
significant details to judges. But the prosecutorial discretion model does not 
offer a much better explanation. We have strong reason to believe that 
prosecutors are constrained actors. When we look at what prosecutors 
actually do, they primarily prosecute core crimes, such as murder, rape, 
robbery, theft, drug crimes, weapon violations, and driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Substantial portions of criminal law have fallen into 
total or partial disuse, including, for example, consensual sex offenses, minor 
speeding, and draft registration evasion. It seems unlikely that prosecutors, 
exercising their own independent judgment, have such widely convergent 
preferences on which criminal laws to enforce. Instead, this narrowing of 
substantive law reflects that prosecutors have many constraints on their 
power, even if those constraints do not come from formal law. 
Part II argues that contemporary criminal law is primarily conventional. 
Section A defines what “conventions” are and gives an account of how those 
conventions support the legitimacy of a statutory criminal justice system. 
Section B then illustrates, through examples, that criminal law conventions 
exist and that they form an important part of our criminal law system. 
Part III explains how these unwritten conventions emerge. I look at the 
role of legislatures, elections, jurors, judges, and largely redundant state and 
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federal criminal justice systems. Checks and balances from these sources 
diminish the scope of prosecutorial discretion by placing constant pressure 
on prosecutors to shape their charging decisions around generally accepted 
societal norms. Prosecutors have outer limits on their ability either to 
criminalize conduct that society does not believe is wrong or decriminalize 
conduct that society wants punished. 
Part IV examines the doctrinal implications of having a criminal law 
built on unwritten conventions. Our current system of unwritten criminal law 
conventions does not solve all overcriminalization problems caused by 
broad, vague, and redundant statutes. I examine three areas where our 
conventions have fallen short: the ability of prosecutors to abuse a 
conventional system through arbitrary charges, the lack of true conventions 
in plea-bargained sentences, and the effect of statutory overcriminalization 
on criminal procedure. I then look at how a conventional system should 
address these shortcomings. Building on Adrian Vermeule’s work with 
constitutional law conventions, I argue that judges should enforce criminal 
law conventions only indirectly, meaning that judges should neither ignore 
conventions nor enforce them as independent sources of legal obligations. 
This has two implications. First, because a conventional system relies on 
indirect enforcement of norms, judges should promote checks and balances 
in the criminal justice system. Without enforcing any particular conventions, 
judges can still help maintain a system that allows for conventions to develop. 
Second, judges have limited power, which they should exercise to enforce 
particular conventions through indirect means, such as applying the rule of 
lenity when prosecutors improperly enforce statutes. This final section 
applies this framework to some problematic areas identified in the first 
section. 
Finally, I end on a cautionary note about criminal law conventions. A 
major problem with statutory overcriminalization is the weakening of 
criminal procedure guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of an offense. 
I am more skeptical that doctrinal changes will allow unwritten conventions 
to develop to solve these procedural problems, but I offer some modest 
suggestions. 
I. BEYOND STATUTES AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
This Part argues against the two primary conceptions of contemporary 
criminal law. The first is that criminal law is essentially statutory. 
Legislatures define crimes and punishments, and judges simply carry out the 
will of the legislature. The second is that, although criminal law ought to be 
statutory, criminal law has devolved into a system in which prosecutors 
2021] THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME 415 
essentially write the criminal code through their exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion. Neither account accurately describes our system. The legislative 
supremacy model undervalues the role of formal common law and cannot 
account for how prosecutors effectively narrow the scope of statutory 
criminal law. The prosecutorial discretion model does a poor job explaining 
substantial areas in which prosecutors’ discretion seems to converge across 
jurisdictions. The de facto criminal law—the criminal law courts actually 
enforce—appears to be something different from either statutory criminal 
law or the private whims of thousands of prosecutors. 
A. STATUTORY CRIMINAL LAW 
On the surface, contemporary criminal law appears to be almost 
exclusively statutory. Most criminal law is state law,30 and most states have 
abolished common law crimes.31 An action is criminal only if the state 
legislature has drafted a statute making the conduct unlawful. Even where 
common law crimes exist, their scope is often limited to misdemeanors 
involving public morals.32 Meanwhile, federal law does not recognize 
common law crimes.33 Except for treason, which is defined by the 
Constitution,34 “[t]he definition of the elements is entrusted to the 
legislature.”35 
State and federal courts have bought into the legislative supremacy 
model. They routinely assert that defining crimes is a legislative function,36 
sometimes with strong language that the power “resides wholly” with the 
 
 30 Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political 
Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453 (2009) [hereinafter 
Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization]. 
 31 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 980–83. 
 32 Brenner M. Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 855, 
884 (2020). 
 33 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 35 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985). 
 36 See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118, 123 (Ariz. 1990); 
Curry v. State, 649 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ark. 1983); State v. Darden, 372 A.2d 99, 101 (Conn. 
1976); Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1266 (Ind. 2015); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 
1084, 1085 (La. 1980); State v. Divis, 589 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Neb. 1999); Lapinski v. State, 
446 P.2d 645, 646 (Nev. 1968); State v. Allen, 423 P.2d 867, 868 (N.M. 1967); People v. 
Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8–9 (N.Y. 1942); State v. Wadsworth, 991 P.2d 80, 86–87 (Wash. 
2000). 
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legislature37 or that crimes “are solely creatures of statute.”38 The vision of 
essentially statutory criminal law has led courts to construe criminal laws 
more broadly than they once did. Courts now view their role as simply to 
carry out the legislative intent manifested by the (often broad) text of the 
statute rather than to use the canons of construction to construe criminal 
statutes narrowly.39 If a statute is genuinely ambiguous, courts will apply the 
rule of lenity to narrow it40 but only after exhausting all tools of statutory 
interpretation to discern legislative intent.41 Rightly or wrongly, “[t]he 
dominant attitude expressed in American jurisdictions is one of legislative 
supremacy and exclusivity.”42 
As Hessick, Kahan, and others have explained, this legislative 
supremacy model is closer to fiction than reality.43 At least a dozen states 
retain common law crimes in some form.44 In others, statutes directly 
incorporate common law elements or simply codify common law 
 
 37 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980). 
 38 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; see also Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal. 
1970) (“[A] fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government . . . [is that] the power 
to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.”). 
 39 E.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“The rule comes into 
operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the 
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers. That is not the 
function of the judiciary.”); State v. Goodwin, 82 N.E. 459, 460 (Ind. 1907) (“While the rule 
of strict construction applies generally to the interpretation of criminal statutes, the excessively 
strict construction that formerly prevailed has in recent years been so modified as to look 
within the bounds of reason and common sense to the legislative intent when plainly 
manifested, or expressed, in the enactment.”); People v. Burchell, 100 N.E.3d 660, 665 (Ill. 
App. 2018) (explaining that “the rule of lenity has limits and does not allow a court to construe 
a penal statute so rigidly as to defeat the intent of the legislature”) (internal quotation marks 
and ellipses omitted); see Shon Hopwood, Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon, 
95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 918, 920–21 (2020) (arguing that the modern rule of lenity has been 
narrowed since the 1970s); David S. Romantz, Reconstructing the Rule of Lenity, 40 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 523, 543 (2018) (discussing the narrowing of lenity in federal cases); Sarah Newland, 
Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 197, 202 (1994) (describing tension between legislatures and courts over strict 
construction of criminal statutes). Courts, however, will apply lenity against overbroad 
statutes that punish innocent conduct. Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 
2431 (2006). 
 40 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). 
 41 E.g., United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994). 
 42 McMunigal, supra note 1, at 1287; see also Kahan, supra note 23, at 470 (“The 
conventional account treats substantive [federal] criminal law as exclusively legislative in 
origin . . . .”). 
 43 See, e.g., Hessick, Myth, supra note 1; Kahan, supra note 23; infra notes 55 & 61 and 
accompanying text. 
 44 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 980–83. 
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terminology and concepts.45 For example, North Carolina punishes 
“[r]obbery as defined at common law,”46 and Virginia, though it statutorily 
splits murder into degrees, leaves the actual definition of murder to the 
common law.47 
In many cases where the legislature drafts statutory crimes, the results 
are “exceedingly open-textured statutes” that leave the true definitions to the 
courts.48 The federal government has numerous statutes prohibiting fraud,49 
among the most important of which are prohibitions against mail and wire 
fraud.50 But what is “any scheme or artifice to defraud?”51 The statute does 
not define this key term. So, the real work in defining this crime is done by 
courts rather than by the statute’s text.52 The same holds true for many other 
crimes. Insider trading is a judicial specification of the Securities Exchange 
Act’s prohibition against trading securities using “any manipulative or 
deceptive device.”53 And inchoate crimes, including attempts and 
conspiracy, are more the product of judicial interpretation than their 
legislative definitions.54 
Legislatures also may leave the general part of the law either undefined 
or underdefined. For example, legislatures frequently do not 
comprehensively define causation55 or when individuals have affirmative 
duties to act.56 So even if a legislature defines murder as “intentionally or 
knowingly killing another person,” that still does not tell us when a person 
has “caused” the death or when a person may be held liable for a failure to 
act. These details can make a great difference in criminal cases. Just look at 
 
 45 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.02[b], at 27–29 (8th ed. 2018); 
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 50 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018). 
 51 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 52 Kahan, supra note 23, at 475; Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 988–89. 
 53 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 983–84 (providing and 
explaining the prohibition as an example). 
 54 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 985–86; Kahan, supra note 23, at 472, 475–76, 479. 
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Scot Peterson, the Broward County sheriff’s deputy who failed to intervene 
in the Parkland High School shooting and now faces multiple counts of child 
neglect causing great bodily harm.57 
In some jurisdictions, the common law still furnishes defenses.58 
Federal criminal law, for example, recognizes self-defense, defense of others, 
duress, and necessity, even though no federal statute provides for them.59 
Because the substantive scope of criminal law prohibitions is a function of 
both the elements of a crime and the defenses that one may have, the scope 
of criminal prohibitions is left partially to the common law.60 
Thus, criminal law heavily remains nonstatutory. The common law 
often supplies definitions for crimes, even those that are statutory. The 
common law also defines the general parts of criminal law (e.g., causation). 
And many criminal law defenses are common law, not statutory. As Kevin 
McMunigal concludes, “[T]he distribution of power in regard to criminal 
lawmaking is considerably more complex and nuanced than the notion of 
legislative supremacy indicates and . . . all three branches of government 
exercise power in shaping criminal law.”61 
B. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW AS THE “LAW” OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION 
Many academics offer a different vision from the legislative supremacy 
model. These commentators argue that the true power to define criminal law 
rests in prosecutors’ hands.62 Legislatures pass broad, vague, and redundant 
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 58 Johnson, supra note 55, at 1842; Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman 
Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
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 59 See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 19 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring) (“When 
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instance, self-defense)” not included in statutes); Stephen S. Schwartz, Comment, Is There a 
Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1263 
(2008) (acknowledging judicial recognition of the defense of necessity and duress without any 
statutory recognition). 
 60 For example, by not codifying self-defense, individuals cannot learn what constitutes 
an “unlawful” killing for the purposes of the federal murder statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1111. 
 61 McMunigal, supra note 1, at 1293–94. 
 62 See, e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 509; Bellin, Power of 
Prosecutors, supra note 25, at 173–74 (collecting statements on prosecutorial power). 
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laws that effectively delegate defining crimes and the magnitude of sanctions 
to prosecutors and courts—but mostly to prosecutors, who can select who to 
prosecute and which charges to bring. But a prosecutorial supremacy model 
also does not fit well with how criminal law operates. Prosecutors enforce 
many areas of criminal law consistently, including prioritizing the 
prosecution of core crimes and refusing to enforce crimes for conduct that 
the community no longer condemns. These areas of convergence, across 
thousands of prosecutors with different views, belie the claim that 
prosecutors’ private preferences control. 
1. Prosecutorial Supremacy and Criminal Law 
The prosecutorial supremacy model begins by observing 
overcriminalization in America. Overcriminalization, in part, is a complaint 
about the sheer breadth of criminal codes.63 If one peruses the statute books, 
one can find many desuetudinal crimes and trivial offenses. States frequently 
criminalize adultery and fornication.64 A whole chapter of the federal 
criminal code is dedicated to “Emblems, Insignia, and Names.”65 One section 
of the same code makes it a federal crime to use the Red Cross insignia 
without authorization, while another infamous provision protects “Smokey 
Bear.”66 Scholars routinely complain about these and other seemingly trivial 
offenses.67 And this kind of overbreadth is bad, we are told, because those 
who engage in “conduct that society no longer condemns” still run the risk 
of punishment.68 
A second permutation of the overbreadth problem is that many 
individual statutes cover too much conduct, including conduct that many do 
not consider to be socially harmful.69 Examples can range from petty offenses 
to serious ones. When there is no traffic, few people drive 55 miles per hour 
 
 63 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 512–19; Myers, supra note 9, at 1340. 
 64 Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 229. 
 65 18 U.S.C. ch. 33. 
 66 18 U.S.C. §§ 706, 711, 711a. 
 67 See, e.g., Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 229 & n.16 (recounting overbreadth 
objection and giving these examples); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704–708 (2005); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of 
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 747, 760. But see Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: 
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 
(1997) (explaining that many such laws have legitimate moral reasons supporting the 
criminalization of conduct they prohibit). 
 68 Myers, supra note 9, at 1340–41. 
 69 Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 229 (describing objection). 
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on a major highway, even though they face a possible citation for speeding.70 
March Madness pools fall within anti-gambling statutes.71 And off-duty 
police officers face up to five years in federal prison if they carry their service 
weapons within 1,000 feet of a school—a radius that is hard to avoid in most 
urban and suburban areas.72 
A third permutation of overbreadth is that legislatures enact criminal 
statutes with inadequate mens rea requirements.73 Unlike socially beneficial 
conduct, here a person has committed a social wrong but arguably not in a 
blameworthy way. Take, for example, the prosecution under the National 
Firearms Act in Staples v. United States.74 In Staples, the defendant 
possessed a rifle that had been converted to fully automatic by substituting 
its internal parts.75 Although the defendant knowingly possessed the rifle, he 
contended that he did not know that the firearm had been converted into a 
statutory “machinegun.”76 The National Firearms Act makes it a crime to 
possess an unregistered machinegun but contains no mens rea requirement.77 
Without judicial narrowing of the statute (which ultimately occurred), the 
statute would place those who thought they were engaged in lawful 
conduct—possession of a semiautomatic firearm—at risk of criminal 
conviction. 
Legislatures exacerbate the overbreadth problems with vague statutes.78 
Among oft-cited examples are statutes against loitering, federal fraud 
statutes, laws against racketeering, and statutes containing qualitative 
standards such as prohibiting taking “unreasonable risks.”79 Commentators 
have particularly condemned the application of federal fraud statutes.80 
Those critics observe that federal prosecutors use fraud statutes to prosecute 
 
 70 See, e.g., State v. Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 398 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (“In fact, studies 
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 74 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
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 78 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1137 
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 79 Id. at 1140–41, 1146 n. 46. 
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breaches of fiduciary duties that seem more appropriately handled in civil 
courts.81 
Compounding the overbreadth and vagueness problems, legislatures 
also draft redundant criminal codes.82 Redundancy can be 
“interjurisdictional” or “intrajurisdictional.”83 Intrajurisdictional redundancy 
occurs when a criminal code has multiple, overlapping crimes.84 A person 
who commits armed robbery of a motor vehicle may have violated laws 
against carjacking, armed robbery, grand theft, and illegal carrying or use of 
a firearm. Interjurisdictional redundancy occurs when multiple levels of 
government criminalize the same conduct.85 The federal criminal code has 
expanded to include many core state crimes, such as robbery, weapons 
offenses, drug possession, and sex offenses.86 In fact, other than immigration 
violations, most federal prosecutions today involve gun and drug violations 
that are almost always punishable under state law.87 
Finally, scholars object to the harshness of American criminal law.88 
Since the 1980s, Congress and many states have implemented harsh 
mandatory minimum sentence schemes.89 Low-level drug dealers frequently 
face “years or decades in federal prison.”90 And prosecutors, thanks to certain 
statutory enhancements, have applied harsh mandatory minimums against 
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recidivists who have stolen a slice of pizza, pilfered three golf clubs, or 
possessed a single bullet after a felony conviction.91 
Scholars argue that these defects in statutory criminal law transfer 
enormous power to prosecutors, who are “the criminal justice system’s real 
lawmakers.”92 Because police and prosecutors lack the resources to enforce 
every overbroad criminal statute, executive officers must use their discretion 
to determine which crimes to prosecute and against whom.93 For example, 
many state prosecutors enforce laws against marijuana possession,94 while 
others do not.95 Federal prosecutors choose to enforce laws against gun 
possession and sexual exploitation of minors but not laws against carjacking 
or violence against women.96 Police officers set the de facto speed limits on 
our roads.97 Statutory vagueness contributes to the delegation problem.98 
Because many statutes are “open-ended, vague, and unclear,”99 the 
legislature has effectively failed to define what conduct is criminal and what 
is not. Prosecutors make these determinations in the first instance, and they 
frequently use vague statutes to prosecute an ever-expanding list of bad 
conduct that is not otherwise prohibited by law.100 
For those who believe in prosecutorial supremacy, checks and balances 
are a mirage. “[T]he story of American criminal law,” Stuntz writes, “is a 
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story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom 
benefits from more and broader crimes . . . .”101 Legislators are responsive to 
the electorate, and crime is a significant issue for voters.102 As a result, 
legislatures help prosecutors get guilty pleas by increasing the maximum 
possible sentence and by making new, broad crimes, which are easier for 
prosecutors to prove.103 Broadly-defined crimes and long sentences leave 
defendants with few possible defenses; their only leverage is to forgo trial in 
exchange for reduced sentences or charges. Legislatures also enact symbolic 
legislation to show constituents that they are doing something about crime, 
even if legislators do not expect prosecutors to enforce the law.104 Thus, 
criminal law “always expands,”105 and we are told that “[t]here is near-
universal consensus in the legal community that our criminal laws are a 
mess.”106 
2. Objections to Prosecutorial Supremacy Accounts 
For the reasons Darryl Brown has explained, this description of the 
criminal law, though widely accepted, is both misleading and wrong.107 It is 
misleading because the expansion of criminal law is not inherently a sign of 
overcriminalization.108 Many times, bad people do bad acts but find some 
loophole in the criminal law.109 Also, new criminal law problems emerge as 
society evolves (e.g., drunk driving and computer crimes).110 Although this 
results in the expansion of criminal law, this expansion is not normatively 
problematic. Brown also argues that Stuntz’s description of criminal law is 
wrong because legislatures decriminalize large areas of conduct. Legislatures 
have substantially curbed moral and religious crimes, including laws against 
adultery, fornication, and breaking the sabbath, to name a few.111 When 
criminal codes need significant updating, legislatures have also 
decriminalized many crimes at once as part of major law reform 
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recommended by independent commissions who study the code.112 The 
criminal law, in other words, does not “always expand.” 
Moving from criminal codes to prosecutors, Jeffrey Bellin has argued 
why prosecutors lack much of the absolute power often attributed to them to 
“make” the criminal law. At the outset, Bellin explains, the claim that 
prosecutors make criminal law is ambiguous about which official is 
responsible.113 Is it the head district or U.S. attorney, who may set office 
policies but personally prosecute few cases? Or is it their assistants, who may 
be responsible for the vast majority of charging decisions? Or is it police or 
law enforcement, who generally initiate criminal process through their 
investigations and arrests? There are 2,344 prosecutor offices that employ 
“about 78,000 attorneys, investigators, victim advocates, and support 
staff,”114 and they run the political gamut from liberal cities to conservative 
rural regions. One cannot assume that these actors share prosecutorial 
preferences. 
Even if we could pin down which prosecutor is the decisionmaker, there 
is significant reason to doubt that that person actually has the unilateral power 
to set criminal justice policy. As Bellin continues, a person may exercise 
discretion in different kinds of ways; a person can use his discretion when 
executing a plan that “achiev[es] a shared goal,” or a person can exercise 
discretion to “mak[e] a group of people do what you want.”115 Prosecutors 
may have significant prosecutorial power in the “shared goal” sense—that is, 
when they exercise their prosecutorial discretion in accordance with the 
norms of the community and of other actors in the criminal justice system, 
such as legislators and judges.116 But prosecutors have difficulty exercising 
their prosecutorial discretion to override the judgment of everyone else in the 
community.117 
In fact, the conventional prosecutorial discretion account acknowledges 
that prosecutors have significant limits on their discretion. Proponents of this 
model recognize that the prosecution of violent felonies by local prosecutors 
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is “as a practical matter, mandatory in every case”118 because the public 
demands that prosecutors vigorously pursue such charges.119 So, claims that 
“[t]he law-on-the-street—the law that determines who goes to prison and for 
how long—is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by legislators or judges” do 
not apply to significant portions of criminal law. 120 
If prosecutors truly had plenary power to set the criminal law, their 
power would likely result in extraordinarily heterogeneous criminal justice 
policy. Yet, the data we have on convictions and imprisonment demonstrate 
that law enforcement efforts are mostly targeted at a narrow range of core 
criminal behavior widely condemned by society. Start with state felony 
convictions. About 85% of state felony convictions are for violent crimes, 
burglary, larceny, fraud, drug crimes, and weapon offenses.121 The remaining 
15% is a nonviolent category and includes receiving stolen property and 
vandalism.122 Looking at the federal system, nearly three-quarters of felony 
convictions involve drug offenses, immigration crimes, and weapons 
violations.123 These crimes also constitute about two-thirds of all federal 
convictions (federal misdemeanor prosecutions comprise less than 10% of 
the federal criminal docket).124 Add fraud to that list, and the percentage 
increases to about 85% of all federal felony convictions and more than three-
quarters of all federal crimes.125 
As with convictions, imprisonment data also reflects consistency in 
punishing core criminal wrongdoing. There are about 2.3 million 
incarcerated people in the United States: 1.3 million in state prisons, about 
630,000 in local jails, and 226,000 federal prisoners.126  More than half the 
people in state prisons are there for violent offenses, mostly murder, 
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manslaughter, sexual assault (including rape), robbery, and assault.127 The 
other half is split among property crimes, drug crimes, and public order 
offenses (e.g., driving under the influence and weapons violations).128 
Federal prisoners, like their state counterparts, are overwhelmingly 
imprisoned for a narrow range of crimes. Nearly two-thirds of federal 
prisoners are imprisoned for drug offenses and weapons violations, and that 
percentage increases to nearly three-quarters when sex offenses are 
included.129 The remaining 25% is overwhelming composed of prisoners 
convicted of extortion, fraud, bribery, immigration offenses, property crimes 
(e.g., burglary and larceny), robbery, and other core violent crimes 
(homicide, aggravated assault, and kidnapping) with a federal nexus.130 
Federal criminal law, thus, seems to have a well-defined core around 
immigration, drugs, guns, and fraud, belying that individual federal 
prosecutors are setting federal criminal law. 
If there is one area that lacks good data, it is state misdemeanor practice. 
This is unfortunate. Unlike the federal criminal law docket, state-law 
misdemeanor cases make up approximately three-quarters of all criminal 
cases.131 And in general, different jurisdictions treat misdemeanors more 
disparately than they do felony cases.132 In a survey of eight jurisdictions, 
Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson have found that the “core” of 
misdemeanor practice generally comprised “possession of marijuana, simple 
assault (often domestic violence), petty larceny (often shoplifting)[,] 
. . . DUI . . . disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, prostitution, vandalism, 
trespass, public intoxication, underage drinking, and unlawful possession of 
weapons, drug paraphernalia, or crime tools.”133 Although norms may be 
shifting on some conduct (e.g., whether possession of marijuana should 
remain a crime), most of this list (for example, driving under the influence, 
assault, vandalism, and larceny) involves wrongdoing that the community 
consistently condemns. 
In providing these statistics, I do not deny either that 
overcriminalization is a problem or that prosecutors have tremendous 
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discretion. We can debate, for example, the legitimacy of broad drug laws 
and vague fraud statutes. Many criminal codes are also too harsh, carry too 
long of prison sentences, and bear all of the collateral consequences that 
come along with having too many technical felonies. Even if the community 
thinks that drug dealing ought to be unlawful, that does not imply that it is 
appropriate to imprison low-level street dealers for decades or life. And 
prosecutors exercise enormous discretion in important pockets of the 
criminal justice system. Through their charging and plea decisions, they can 
exercise considerable power over punishing those who commit crimes.134 
Prosecutors, for example, are not required to pursue sentencing 
enhancements. And, more broadly, police and prosecutors may investigate 
crimes with different thoroughness. For example, having “stop and frisk” in 
one neighborhood, but not another, will almost certainly turn up more illegal 
weapons in the place where the stop and frisk policy is carried out—which, 
in turn, will affect who gets incarcerated. But these elements of prosecutorial 
discretion are a different kind of discretion from prosecutors having the 
quasi-legislative power to set the criminal code. Prosecutors only have that 
power at the margins.135 
Finally, the political economy explanation undergirding the plenary 
prosecutor model has not aged well. Whatever may have been true during the 
1980s and 1990s, current voters’ political preferences do not appear to be as 
uniformly “tough on crime” as the plenary prosecutor approach suggests. The 
plenary prosecutor model describes a dysfunctional cycle in which 
legislators, with voter approval, expand crimes and make sentences harsher 
to give prosecutors more power.136 But overcriminalization has emerged as a 
politically salient issue today, with political constituencies pushing back on 
both the pervasiveness of criminal law and its harshness. The killing of 
George Floyd has prompted calls to “defund the police,” leading many cities 
to reevaluate the kinds of cases police departments handle.137 About half the 
states have decriminalized some forms of minor drug possession and use.138 
 
 134 Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization, supra note 30, at 461–63. 
 135 For crimes where people have conflicted norms or where norms are evolving (e.g., 
marijuana possession) prosecutors have much more discretion. 
 136 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 510. 
 137 See Rashawn Ray, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean and Does It Have Merit?, 
BROOKINGS (June 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-does-
defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/ [https://perma.cc/E6MT-DQ53]; Scottie 
Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police. Here’s What It Means, CNN (June 17, 
2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/what-is-defund-police-trnd/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/SG5T-KD84]. 
 138 Drug Policy Alliance, Drug Decriminalization, DRUGPOLICY.ORG, https://drugpolicy.
org/issues/drug-decriminalization [https://perma.cc/LA3N-P4DJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
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Many urban areas have elected so-called progressive prosecutors who have 
run against incumbents for arresting too many people for too many petty 
crimes.139 For prosecutors and politicians in many jurisdictions, being too 
tough on crime has become politically toxic.140  To reduce the harshness of 
criminal law, Congress and several states have recently passed sentencing 
reform, including curbing mandatory minimums.141 And a number of 
jurisdictions have abolished the death penalty either de jure or de facto.142 
Overall executions are low compared with the 1990s and concentrated in just 
a few states.143 The present trend favors less harsh criminal law, not more. 
Thus, neither prevailing model of criminal law is a good fit for how our 
system actually operates. Our criminal law is not exclusively statutory. 
Unwritten law exists everywhere. Because of vague and overbroad laws, 
there is also a schism between statutory criminal law and how that criminal 
law is enforced. Yet, from this, we should not conclude that criminal law has 
devolved into only a “law” of prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors are only 
one part of the criminal justice system. Many other individuals—legislators, 
judges, voters, jurors, among others—also exercise significant power over 
the system, and they may have competing or different priorities from 
prosecutors. The net result is that while prosecutors exercise significant 
influence over criminal justice policy, they do not control it. 
II. CRIMINAL LAW AS A CONVENTIONAL SYSTEM 
In the next two Parts, I offer a different vision of American criminal 
law, one that recognizes that American criminal law remains primarily 
 
 139 Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecutors,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 750–51 
(2018). 
 140 Id. at 751; cf. Eugene Scott, Joe Biden’s Tough-on-Crime Past Could Haunt Him in 
2020, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2019/01/23/joe-bidens-tough-on-crime-past-could-haunt-him/ [https://perma.cc/W5YB-ZG
MW] (explaining that Joe Biden’s prior support for severe criminal penalties would be a 
political liability for him in the Democratic presidential primary). 
 141 First Step Act of 2018, § 401 Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (reducing 
mandatory minimum sentences and preventing the stacking of offenses that triggers 
mandatory minimum penalties); Nauman, supra note 89, at 870–72; see also Brown, 
Democracy, supra note 27, at 267 n.214. 
 142 Twenty-one states, as well as the District of Colombia, have officially abolished the 
death penalty. Four other states are currently operating under a gubernatorial moratoria. States 
with & Without the Death Penalty - 2020, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state [https://perma.cc/9XWF-8WMK] (last visited Feb. 
21, 2021). 
 143 AMBER WIDGERY, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 3 (July 30, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/the-
state-of-capital-punishment.aspx [https://perma.cc/963H-PJE4]. 
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unwritten. This Part argues that contemporary criminal law is defined by 
unwritten conventions that are widely acknowledged and respected but lack 
the status of formal law. Section A defines what “conventions” are and the 
justification for having them, and Section B offers evidence that they form a 
substantial part of our criminal law system. Part III of this Article will then 
explain the legal and nonlegal checks that cause these conventions to arise. 
A. WHAT ARE CONVENTIONS? WHY HAVE THEM? 
Let me begin with the definition of a legal “convention.” Following 
A.V. Dicey, Joseph Jaconelli, Adrian Vermeule, and others, I posit that a 
“convention” is a kind of rule that is (1) not statutory or written law; (2) not 
unwritten law enforceable in court (i.e., not common law); but (3) is generally 
accepted as binding on legal actors; and (4) is enforceable against legal actors 
through indirect methods such as political pressure.144 
Conventions are something more than mere exercises of discretion, 
even if that discretion is exercised in a regular way.145 To constitute a legal 
convention, an action not only has to be “regular,” it must also “rest[] on a 
sense of normative obligation.”146 Thus, criminal law conventions are not 
merely the fortuitous results of various institutional arrangements. What 
makes something a convention is that individuals accept the normative force 
of the conventions’ directives. As Barber has stated, “[c]onventions are rules 
and, like laws, they purport to provide reasons for action that pre-empt, to 
use Raz’s term, consideration of the reasons on which they depend.”147 
Conventions have a complex relationship with formal law. Many 
conventions operate interstitially. The U.S. Constitution does not direct how 
electors would select the President, nor (before the Twenty-Second 
 
 144 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 283, 288 (2015) 
[hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions in Court] (defining “conventions” as “(1) unwritten rules 
of political behaviour that are (2) widely acknowledged and regularly followed from (3) a 
sense of obligation—either (3A) a thin sense of obligation resting on a credible threat of 
sanctions or (3B) a thick sense of obligation resting on internalised precepts of political 
morality”); see also Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1163, 1182 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence] (giving 
attributes of conventions); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 280–81 (8th ed. 1915); Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional 
Convention, 19 LEGAL STUDS. 24, 35–39 (1999); Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: 
Constitutional Conventions in U.S. Constitutional Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 483 (2018); 
Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1852 (2013). 
 145 Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 287–88. 
 146 Id. 
 147 N.W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 83 (Martin Loughlin, John P. McCormick 
& Neil Walker eds., 2010). 
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Amendment) did it provide how often a President could be reelected. Yet, 
conventions require that presidential electors vote for the candidate for whom 
they have pledged and, before the adoption of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, limited the President to two terms.148 Conventions may also 
supersede formal law. For example, in Britain, “the Prime Minister has the 
power to declare war, even though, legally, this power is held by the 
Monarch.”149 
One of the critical distinctions between conventions and formal law, 
however, is that conventions are not enforceable through ordinary legal 
channels. In Britain, for a bill to become law, the bill ordinarily must pass 
both Houses of Parliament and receive the royal assent.150 And British 
constitutional conventions require that the monarch consent to a bill that has 
passed Parliament.151 The Queen’s decision to veto a bill sua sponte might 
provoke a constitutional crisis.152 But in a British court, that bill would not 
be law. Because conventions are not directly binding and enforceable within 
the legal system, commentators debate the degree to which they constitute 
“law.”153 I will bracket that debate in this Article.154 But a convention’s lack 
of status as formal law means that someone can say, without contradiction, 
that a convention “places constitutional (but not legal) limits on the capacity 
of” a legislature.155 
Given that conventions are not enforceable in court, one might be 
tempted to ignore them when describing the legal system. Blackstone took 
 
 148 Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 286 (providing these and other 
examples). The Supreme Court has recently upheld state laws that incorporate electoral 
college conventions requiring electors to vote for their pledged candidates. Chiafalo v. 
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2329 (2020). 
 149 BARBER, supra note 147, at 93. 
 150 Jeremy Waldron, Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 
1702 (2006). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 1704 (“The Queen knows that she must not withhold her consent, and she knows 
that if she did, her action would not be regarded just as surprising or unprecedented, but 
condemned as wrong and unconstitutional. She treats it as a rule that she must follow.”). 
 153 Id. at 1697; Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, supra note 144, at 1182–
84. 
 154 Depending on whether conventions truly are “law,” the title of this article is either 
literal or metaphorical. 
 155 BARBER, supra note 147, at 79 n.22 (“The Sewel convention places constitutional (but 
not legal) limits on the capacity of the Westminster Parliament to legislate in areas devolved 
to the Scottish Parliament . . . .”); see also Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, 
at 290 (explaining that “legal but unconstitutional” is “a seeming oxymoron to the American-
trained lawyer” but not to a Commonwealth lawyer) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that approach when describing the British constitution,156 dedicating several 
chapters to royal executive power but not discussing the prime minister or 
the cabinet.157 But as Dicey pointed out, Blackstone’s explanation of the 
British government “ha[d] but one fault; the statements it contains are the 
direct opposite of the truth.”158 In reality, the British constitution by 
convention vests de facto executive power in the cabinet and, especially, the 
prime minister.159 Thus, as Barber has concluded, “an understanding of these 
non-legal rules is essential to a plausible account of the constitution.”160 
Criminal law, I will argue, has similar conventions. On paper, 
Wisconsin makes adulterers felons,161 federal law prohibits the possession of 
marijuana, including for medicinal purposes,162 and the speed limits on many 
highways are fifty-five miles per hour. But this is not the de facto criminal 
law system. The laws on adultery are in desuetude, federal law enforcement 
targets drug trafficking but not mere possession of marijuana for personal 
use,163 and the speed limits enforced on our roads are about ten to fifteen 
miles per hour more than the posted sign.164 Real criminal law and statutory 
criminal law have diverged, just like the real British constitution does not 
resemble Blackstone’s purely legalistic framework. 
With respect to the scope of criminal law conventions, I do not suggest 
that those conventions exist exclusively at either the national or local level. 
Unwritten English law recognized both “general customs”—that is, “the 
common law, properly so called”165—and “[p]articular customs” which were 
unwritten laws that “affect[ed] only the inhabitants of particular districts.”166 
In our federal system, criminal law conventions probably have a similar 
structure. Many conventions are national in scope. One easy example is the 
decriminalization of consensual sex offenses.167 Even prosecutors in remote 
and religiously conservative areas do not prosecute adultery and 
 
 156 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *190–337. 
 157 BARBER, supra note 147, at 81–82 (providing this example). 
 158 DICEY, supra note 144, at cxxx. 
 159 Rodney Brazier, A British Republic, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 351, 357 (2002). 
 160 BARBER, supra note 147, at 81–82. 
 161 WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2020). 
 162 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2010). 
 163 Sadie Gurman, Sessions: U.S. Prosecutors Won’t Take on Small-Time Pot Cases, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/5b27da207202466f90a08ae87614e
aea/Sessions:-US-prosecutors-won’t-take-on-small-time-pot-cases [https://perma.cc/3TXU-3
K6E]. 
 164 See infra notes 214–234 and accompanying text. 
 165 BLACKSTONE, supra note 156, at *63. 
 166 Id. at *67. 
 167 Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 235. 
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fornication.168 And the contrary examples sometimes cited are bizarre and 
fleeting incidents.169 Local customs exist, too. For example, rural areas may 
ignore violations of a state’s concealed weapons law, while urban areas may 
prosecute those crimes more vigorously.170 The recent debate over “Second 
Amendment sanctuary cities” may be seen as an effort to create local 
customary law that effectively nullifies state statutory law within the 
jurisdiction.171 And even though our national drug norms may be in flux, 
many cities have developed local customs that tolerate some personal use of 
recreational drugs—San Francisco may be the most extreme example.172 
Of the many justifications for having conventions, a principal purpose 
is that conventions correct for defects in the formal legal system. In the 
British constitutional system, one obvious defect is legitimacy. What gives a 
hereditary monarch the right to wield executive power? The conventional 
cabinet system largely abates this democratic deficit by vesting de facto 
executive power in a government accountable to the voters.173 Conventional 
criminal law serves a similar legitimacy function to constitutional 
conventions. Although I will not lay out a full theory of criminal law, for 
present purposes, I will assume that what makes an act punishable is, in part, 
 
 168 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ADULTERY: INFIDELITY AND THE LAW 61–67 (2016) 
(explaining that adultery statutes “are generally unenforced” even when prosecutors have 
evidence of a violation). 
 169 Id.; Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 258–59. 
 170 See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., 
FIREARMS, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 2 (Nov. 1995) 
[hereinafter WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS], https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/woofccj.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9J8X-7KWL]. 
 171 See, e.g., Letter from Mark R. Herring, Virginia Attorney General, to Hon. Jerrauld C. 
Jones, Member, Virginia House of Delegates (Dec. 20, 2019), https://oag.state.va.us/files
/Opinions/2019/19-059-Jones-issued.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYN3-MQ8X] (opining on the 
legality of Virginia’s sanctuary cities). For a limited defense of sanctuary cities, see Shawn E. 
Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2020). My argument in this 
Article would provide a qualified defense of sanctuary cities when prosecutors refuse to 
enforce statutory laws that do not accord with legal conventions. But see infra note 174 
(explaining when legal conventions may be unworthy of respect). 
 172 See Lee Ohanian, Why Drug Addicts Outnumber High School Students in San 
Francisco, HOOVER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/why-drug-addicts-
outnumber-high-school-students-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/AR4M-DN2X]. 
 173 See Brazier, supra note 159, at 357 (noting that power has shifted from the Crown to 
democratic institutions). But see id. at 383 (explaining that substantial portions of the royal 
prerogative exercised by ministers lack effective democratic oversight). 
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that the action breaches societal norms.174 Criminal law conventions help 
shape statutory criminal law around evolving norms. 
If the goal is to have a criminal law with democratic legitimacy, one 
might think that only a democratically elected legislature should determine 
the proper scope of criminalization. Many commentators hold such views. 
Some argue that legislative approval is more democratic than having 
common law crimes.175 Others go so far as to argue that legislative approval 
is a necessary element of the principle of legality176 or required by political 
theories of punishment.177 For example, relying on an expressivist theory of 
punishment, Brenner Fissell asserts that “the symbolic communication of 
condemnation must come from the community and that therefore the duties 
imposed by criminal law must be determined by a democratic institution.”178 
But democratic legitimacy does not inherently follow from legislative 
action. The existence of majoritarian approval is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to make statutory law. Legislators are imperfect agents of their 
constituents’ views. Legislators get captured by special interests, or they vote 
based on the views of an impassioned minority over more apathetic 
majority.179 In either case, one cannot necessarily infer democratic 
legitimacy from legislative approval. 
 
 174 Joel Feinberg, for example, argues that what separates criminal punishment from other 
types of penalties is the expression of society condemning the act subject to punishment. Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965). Joshua Kleinfield 
uses the metaphor that “crime is a tearing of social fabric, and punishment is a restitching of 
that torn social fabric.” Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in 
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1500 (2016); cf. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative 
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. Rev. 1655, 1678 
(2010) (“A criminal is normatively innocent where his conduct is undeserving of communal 
condemnation, even if it is contrary to law.”) [hereinafter Bowers, Equitable Decision]. Again, 
this comes with the qualification that I am not attempting to articulate a theory of just criminal 
law. I do not contend that societal condemnation is sufficient to warrant the imposition of 
criminal punishment, nor that societal acceptance is sufficient to justify the lawfulness of 
conduct. Correlatively, I accept that some criminal law conventions exist because society 
recognizes them, and yet believe that they are unworthy of respect because they are 
incompatible with general principles of justice. 
 175 Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 976 & n.40. 
 176 Id. at 976 (collecting examples of such theories). 
 177 Fissell, supra note 32, at 900–06. 
 178 Id. at 891; see also Myers, supra note 9, at 1341 (raising concerns that desuetudinal 
and unconstitutional statutes will muddle criminal law’s expressive message). 
 179 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 132–68 (1965) (discussing 
special interests); Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 69 (2006). 
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Majoritarian support, moreover, is insufficient to pass legislation. 
Legislation faces many nonmajoritarian vetogates.180 Presidents and 
governors can veto bills that enjoy majority support. The federal Senate is 
malapportioned. Heads of legislative committees enjoy disproportionate 
influence over legislative business. Legislative time is limited; many state 
legislatures are part-time, with heavily compressed schedules. As a result, 
many laws with majoritarian support do not get passed, and contemporary 
statutes lacking such support do not get repealed.181 
In some cases, the inability for simple majorities to get preferred 
criminal law legislation through the legislature may be a positive thing. One 
can distinguish, as James Madison did in the Federalist Papers, between a 
majoritarian faction and “the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.”182 If, as Fissell argues, “the symbolic communication of 
condemnation must come from the community,”183 perhaps we want the 
condemnation to come from the community broadly rather than from a mere 
majority. This has the advantage of defaulting to favor liberty over the 
coercive effects of criminal law. And I will argue below that, because of the 
ability of impassioned minorities to disrupt criminal law norms, conventional 
criminal law is more consensus-driven than majoritarian. 
For statutory criminal law, however, the inability of the majority to 
repeal or amend criminal law legislation leads to an objection analogous to 
the dead hand objection in constitutional law: from a democratic perspective, 
why should we care if a legislature passed a crime unless a recent legislature 
did so?184 Legislatures passed many crimes decades or centuries ago.185 
Some of these old laws are in desuetude. But many are not, and some 
jurisdictions enforce them vigorously. Congress passed the Controlled 
Substances Act in 1971,186 the Gun Control Act in 1968,187 the law against 
presidential assassinations in 1965,188 and the Espionage Act in 1917.189 How 
does legislative approval decades or a century ago confer legitimacy today? 
 
 180 For a discussion of vetogates, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70–80 (2d ed. 2006). 
 181 See, e.g., Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 249, 261; Myers, supra note 9, at 1345–
46. 
 182 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 183 Fissell, supra note 32, at 891 (emphasis added). 
 184 Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 367 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting); Myers, 
supra note 9, at 1332–34. 
 185 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1799). 
 186 Controlled Substances Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. 
 187 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. 
 188 Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-141, 79 Stat. 580. 
 189 Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217. 
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The existence of criminal law conventions provides an answer to this 
problem. We have developed an unwritten common law of crime by using 
various political and legal checks to constrain prosecutorial decision-making 
around contemporary community norms. Thus, we recognize certain criminal 
statutes as legitimately constituting our modern criminal law because the 
community presently recognizes the actions these statutes prohibit as 
wrong.190 In part, the true justification for a criminal law is not the existence 
of a statute, but the community’s present belief that those who commit the 
acts described in the statute deserve public censure and punishment.191 
This justification provides a better answer than other alternatives. 
Perhaps one could argue that Congress has implicitly blessed old statutes by 
not repealing them or by recently amending the statutes, thereby accepting 
their legitimacy sub silentio. But this, again, ignores how difficult it is to 
legislate in our system; nonmajoritarian vetogates prevent new laws from 
passing, and they prevent us from repealing old laws. As a result, many 
statutes exist that the majority does not support, but which lack sufficient 
legislative support to repeal. Contemporary conventions provide a better 
justification than legislative inaction. 
The existence of conventions also explains why broad and vague laws 
are less of a problem in practice than in theory. At first glance, our broad and 
vague criminal statutes may seem like a delegation to prosecutors to develop 
criminal law through their charging decisions. But that power has been 
checked in a variety of ways by legislatures, the public, judges, jurors, and 
other prosecutors. Because of these checks, prosecutors must continually 
mold their enforcement of criminal law around contemporary public norms, 
resulting in a more responsive de facto criminal law than could be achieved 
through a legislative code, through judicial specification alone, or through 
agency rulemaking.192 And the existence of diverse checks by different 
constituencies makes it more difficult for minority special interests to exert 
their will than if criminal justice policy were set just by the legislature or by 
a single prosecutor. If a legislature (captured by a special interest) enacts 
criminal laws distasteful to the community, prosecutors will have a difficult 
time enforcing them. 
 
 190 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1119, 1120 (discussing why the dead-hand argument is not a valid objection to textualism). 
 191 I say “in part” here because I do not want to be construed as condoning a morally 
relative criminal law. See supra note 174. Although beyond this Article, I believe that a 
morally justified criminal law must also be justified by a theory of justice that is external to 
the community’s preferences. 
 192 Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1971) (“[P]ublic attitudes change over time, and it is not always 
possible immediately to adapt the statutory law to these changes.”). 
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Some may object that the lack of official promulgation means that 
ordinary citizens cannot know or understand our criminal law. Myers, for 
example, hypothesizes a person trying to determine whether fornication is 
unlawful. He reads the statute books and finds a law, though someone assures 
him that such laws are not enforced.193 From this, Myers concludes that it is 
“fundamentally unfair” to make someone “choose for herself, at her peril, 
which of the laws on the books to obey . . . .”194 
Although I do not have the space here for a full-fledged defense of 
unwritten law, I think this objection is mistaken. As Stephen Sachs explains 
in Finding Law, people can have knowledge of unwritten and 
nonpromulgated community customs.195 People learn the de facto criminal 
law through observation as part of the shared culture—the same way that 
they learn about most societal customs. A newly-arrived Martian coming to 
live in the United States may be genuinely confused about whether 
fornication is a “real” crime, but no one who has lived in the United States 
would harbor any doubt about the answer to that question. 
That people generally learn criminal law conventions through 
socialization is also evident when officials arrest individuals for violating 
local norms. Although no American jurisdiction enforces laws against 
fornication, jurisdictions vary widely in how they restrict gun possession. 
Restrictive jurisdictions arrest many individuals who carry weapons that are 
lawful in their states of residence but unlicensed in the jurisdiction.196 These 
individuals have no idea about the local laws and customs.197 And 
prosecutors in these jurisdictions often consider the lack of knowledge to be 
a significant mitigating factor, allowing individuals to plead guilty to lesser-
included offenses.198 
Of course, the evolution of criminal law conventions is not a complete 
answer to criminal law’s legitimacy. As Vermeule notes, “[c]onventions are 
equilibria,” and sometimes society settles on equilibria that are “normatively 
abhorrent.”199 Paradigmatic examples include the customs of not prosecuting 
 
 193 Myers, supra note 9, at 1341–42. 
 194 Id. at 1342. 
 195 Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 538–39 (2019). 
 196 See, e.g., Michael Wilson, Legal Guns en Route to New York Are Cause for Arrest 
Before Flight Home, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/
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 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 304–05. 
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whites who killed African Americans in the South200 and white juries treating 
African Americans more harshly than white citizens for comparable 
crimes.201 Another was the underenforcement of domestic violence crimes.202 
The existence of criminal law conventions does not insulate criminal law 
from societal defects generally. Quite to the contrary, societal defects may 
entail defects in criminal law conventions by hampering the indirect 
enforcement of criminal law norms. A disenfranchised population cannot 
vote out prosecutors, seek legislative changes, pressure city councils to 
change how the police enforce the law, or serve on juries to prevent either 
unjust acquittals or unjust convictions. I do not mean to suggest that our 
conventional system is perfect. But it is better and more legitimate than a 
purely statutory system, particularly because modern statutory systems take 
place under nonideal conditions of limited legislative time and incentives to 
placate special interests. 
B. SOME EVIDENCE THAT CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS EXIST 
My argument in this Section is that criminal law conventions exist. 
These conventions form a crucial and largely overlooked part of substantive 
criminal law, even if they do not constitute “law” in the most technical sense 
of that term. The conventions have a common-law-like nature: they are 
public norms that are widely acknowledged and respected by the public and 
those charged with enforcing and administering criminal law. As with the 
common law, conventional criminal law evolves as new norms emerge, gain 
acceptance, and are recognized.203 Unlike the common law, however, these 
customs are not directly enforceable in court or through other legal channels 
but rely instead on political, public, and private sanctions for their effect.204 
These conventions shape much of de facto substantive criminal law and, thus, 
narrow the effective range of prosecutorial discretion. 
Let me start with perhaps the easiest example of criminal law 
conventions: desuetudinal laws. Although definitions of legal desuetude 
vary, a crime in “desuetude” generally refers to a statutory crime that “has 
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not been enforced for a long period of time, no longer reflects the goals and 
values of the community, and is thus widely ignored.”205 Today, these crimes 
often include morality offenses such as adultery, fornication, and unlawful 
cohabitation.206 
Desuetudinal crimes have posed a significant challenge to our concepts 
of legality. On the one hand, there is widespread recognition that such laws 
are not a de facto part of our criminal justice system.207 Evidence that a law 
has fallen into desuetude involves “a combination of open violations of the 
law and conscious decisions not to prosecute.”208 Yet, except in West 
Virginia, courts have refused to invalidate such laws, so they remain part of 
the statutory criminal law corpus.209 
Desuetudinal crimes fit the general criteria of criminal law conventions. 
In most jurisdictions, no rule internal to the legal system—whether statutory 
or common law—renders such laws unenforceable.210 Yet, the community 
generally recognizes that the laws are not part of the de facto criminal law. 
Prosecutors almost never bring such charges, let alone successfully convict 
offenders. And this is not a matter of mere prosecutorial discretion. The 
norms against prosecuting such cases are so well-engrained that prosecutors 
bringing such charges would likely face insurmountable resistance both 
politically and from other actors in the criminal justice system.211 Thus, when 
the New York governor publicly admitted committing adultery, he could 
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declare publicly (and without irony) that he “didn’t break the law,”212 even 
though adultery remains a misdemeanor in New York.213 
For a second example, take an area of great state overcriminalization: 
traffic offenses.214 It is virtually impossible to drive a motor vehicle without 
committing a traffic offense.215 Speeding is one of the most common 
offenses. The general guidance on setting speed limits is that the limit 
“should be the 85th percentile speed of free-flowing traffic, rounded up to 
the nearest 10 km/h (5 mph) increment.”216 But, as nearly everyone knows, 
that does not happen. Speed limits are routinely set too low,217 usually by 
about ten to fifteen miles per hour.218 Executive nonenforcement ultimately 
compensates. In a study of 1.3 million speed tickets issued by Massachusetts 
police from 2010 through part of 2016, fewer than 0.1% were for driving less 
than five miles above the speed limit and 1.1% were for driving less than ten 
miles per hour over.219 A study of Ohio traffic tickets found that Ohio police 
rarely ticketed drivers going less than ten miles per hour above the speed 
limit.220 And in Virginia courts, in 2018, the percentage of tickets for drivers 
going less than five miles per hour above the speed limit was 0.007% and 
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under ten miles per hour was 2.3%, whereas nearly 30% of cases involved 
going 10 to 14 miles per hour.221 Put somewhat differently, the true speed 
limits on our roads are conventional rather than statutory. Motorists 
believe—and enforcement statistics back up the belief—that the de facto 
speed limit is about 10 to 15 miles per hour over the de jure limit. 
The traffic offense example demonstrates how conventional law 
modifies statutory law. The real norms for traffic speed are not found in 
statutory law or regulations. They are not common law that one can enforce 
in courts.222 No individual or government body having authority has 
promulgated them, and no court has recognized them.223 Despite this, these 
traffic customs are public, well-known, and respected as norms by both law 
enforcers and citizens.224 And these norms are enforced by indirect sanctions. 
For example, when North Carolina police implemented its “obey the sign or 
pay the fine” campaign, the mere rumor that police would strictly enforce 
speed limits unsettled community expectations and became a newsworthy 
event.225 After police stated that they have the power to ticket motorists 
exceeding the speed limit by any amount,226 community concern prompted 
officials to reassure the public that police still had discretion to ignore de 
minimis speeding.227 Political pressure prevented excessively strict 
enforcement. 
Although speeding is only a petty offense, the example highlights how 
criminal law conventions correct for deficiencies in our statutory law. 
Ideally, speed limits would reflect the true speed limit above which 
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enforcement would begin. Then everyone would have notice of the actual 
limit and the consequences for violating. As it stands now, the “true” speed 
limit is an unknown limit, approximately ten to twenty miles per hour over 
the de jure limit. But as imperfect as it may be, unwritten conventional norms 
provide some corrective measure. Statutory speed limits are regarded as too 
low. But individuals know with substantial certainty that they will not face 
enforcement if they drive within about ten miles per hour of the speed limit 
and with almost complete certainty if they stay within five.228 A driver’s 
knowledge about the rules of the road come from custom, not from a statute 
or a posted speed limit. 
One may object that police enforcement patterns simply reflect how law 
enforcement behaves in the face of resource constraints. With limited 
budgets, 229 police and prosecutors prioritize some crimes over others. And 
when everyone violates the speed limit, police lack the resources to enforce 
speed limits against all motorists. 
But this is an unpersuasive rationalization. Even where technology has 
reduced resource constraints,230 such as when cities use speed cameras, they 
do not prosecute people for de minimis speeding.231 In the District of 
Columbia, tickets are generally issued only when the driver exceeds the 
speed limit by ten miles per hour.232 In Maryland, the legislature 
(undoubtedly recognizing the conventional nature of speeding) imposed the 
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enforcement limit for speed cameras; Maryland’s law prohibits speed-camera 
tickets for less than twelve miles per hour above the limit.233 In New York, 
the City will issue tickets only for at least ten miles per hour over the limit.234 
So, the customs survive, even when few resource constraints exist; and where 
legislatures are afraid that police will not respect the customs, they 
incorporate them into statutory law. 
For a third example, take the difference between federal and state 
criminal law. Unwritten conventions of criminal law mediate the boundary 
between these criminal law systems. On paper, federal criminal law 
essentially duplicates state law, a fact that scholars widely criticize.235 Yet, 
as Klein and Grobey have explained, the “explosion in federal criminal law 
. . . is largely irrelevant to charging decisions made by federal prosecutors. 
Many of these new federal crimes are virtually ignored or overlooked by 
prosecutors.”236 
Where is the boundary? The federal government often focuses on cases 
that involve substantial interstate activity, are unusually complex, or involve 
matters of national concern.237 For example, the federal government 
generally prosecutes international drug trafficking, while leaving drug 
possession to the states.238 The federal government prosecutes international 
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terrorism cases, even though these could be prosecuted under state law.239 
And the federal government often prosecutes interstate sex crimes.240 
In contrast, federal prosecutors rarely seek to prosecute core state 
crimes, even when they have the legal authority. Statutes against domestic 
violence, carjacking, gun free school zones, and motor vehicle theft sit 
largely unused.241 Undergirding this disuse are norms against federal 
prosecutors usurping areas of traditional state concern, especially when state 
law is adequate. 
How has this boundary developed? Through usage and tradition. 
Customary law develops when there is “a widespread practice, and . . . the 
practice [is] followed from a sense of obligation.”242 By custom, some crimes 
become part of federal criminal law, while others do not. 
For example, federal prosecutors routinely prosecute felons who 
illegally possess firearms.243 The Gun Control Act generally prohibits the 
possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony if that firearm has 
moved one time in interstate or foreign commerce.244 Between fiscal years 
2008 and 2017, federal prosecutors averaged about 9,100 prosecutions of 
firearm offenses per year.245 Of those, about 60% were cases in which felon 
in possession was the lead charge.246 To put that number in perspective, 
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federal prosecutors averaged a little more than 60,000 federal prosecutions 
per year during that same time period.247 So, almost one in ten federal 
prosecutions was primarily for a felon illegally possessing a gun. 
In contrast, Congress prohibited traveling in interstate commerce for the 
purpose of committing domestic violence.248 The law passed in 1994 by solid 
majorities in Congress—more than 55% in the House and more than 60% in 
the Senate.249 Yet, the federal government hardly prosecutes the law. During 
the past twenty years, the federal government has filed between one and 
eighteen cases per year where this was the lead charge.250 More people are 
prosecuted for going less than five miles per hour above the speed limit.251 
And this is not because domestic violence is rare or because the American 
people do not support prosecuting people who harm their family members.252 
Likely, individual federal prosecutors do not feel empowered to routinely 
federalize domestic violence cases even when they can satisfy the federal 
jurisdictional nexus. 
The boundary between federal and state criminal law is also heavily a 
customary law. For many crimes, federal jurisdiction is easy to acquire—the 
gun moved once in interstate commerce, a person used a telephone to commit 
fraud, a robbery affects interstate commerce253—so, the crime could be 
prosecuted in state or federal court. Federal prosecutors cannot prosecute 
everything within their jurisdiction, so they must narrow their focus. As 
Richman recognizes, the border between federal and state criminal law is 
both complex and evolving.254 Underneath it are three key facts that help 
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demarcate the line, independent of any agreements between federal and local 
prosecutors. 
First, the border is heavily a law of sentencing. Regardless of the 
theoretical maximum sentences, actual sentences imposed in the federal 
system are often harsher than in the state system for comparable crimes, 
partially because of stiff statutory mandatory minimums and the lack of 
parole.255 Prosecutors consequently decide whether to pursue federal charges 
based on whether criminal defendants may deserve more punishment than is 
available under the state system.256 Although felon-in-possession cases make 
up the bulk of federal gun prosecutions, the federal government still leaves 
substantial numbers of these cases to the states.257 Usually, the federal 
government targets gun offenders who have more significant criminal 
histories or who may be a danger to the community.258 
Conversely, when federal penalties are too harsh, federal prosecutors 
leave prosecutions to the states. Take, for example, the prohibition against 
carrying a concealed weapon aboard a commercial aircraft. Congress 
originally made it a misdemeanor to carry a concealed weapon, unless the 
person acted willfully or recklessly in “disregard for the safety of human 
life,” which upgraded the offense to a felony.259 In 1994, Congress increased 
the penalty for mere possession to a felony punishable by up to ten years in 
prison.260 The new penalty was too harsh for a crime rooted in negligence. 
The Transportation Security Administration found 4,432 firearms in 2019.261 
Most people who attempt to bring a gun through a security checkpoint 
lawfully possess the weapon and simply forgot to remove the gun from their 
bag, briefcase, or purse before going to the airport.262 In response, the Justice 
Department has issued guidelines narrowing the offense to “aggravated 
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cases,” such as those who have a gun to commit a crime or those who 
intentionally try to bring the gun on the plane.263 The Justice Department 
instructs prosecutors to refer other cases to state prosecutors or, if 
appropriate, to use a federal misdemeanor provision.264 And, as with many 
of the previous examples, this is not just attributable to resource constraints: 
quite the contrary, the federal government pursues civil penalties in nearly 
all firearm cases involving airports.265 Instead, federal prosecutors make a 
conscious decision not to file felony federal prosecutions when the 
application of federal criminal law would be excessively harsh in the 
circumstances. 
Second, federal criminal law is often used to defend peculiar federal 
interests, including immigration crimes and fraud against the government.266 
About half of federal prosecutions comprise immigration offenses alone.267 
Third, cases are often brought under federal law when it would be 
difficult for an individual state to investigate or prosecute because they lack 
jurisdiction, resources, or technical knowledge.268 These include complex 
fraud prosecutions, computer crimes, international terrorism, and crimes that 
transcend state jurisdictional boundaries. The federal government has 
emphasized different kinds of crimes over time, and these changes often 
relate to changes in community concerns, from alcohol and kidnapping 
during the 1920s and 1930s to violent crime today.269 The scope of federal 
criminal law is heavily determined by public norms, even if prosecutors may 
memorialize practice dictated by public convention in private agreements or 
in statements of policy about what they will prosecute.270 
The malleable nature of conventional law—especially compared with 
statutory law—aids in allowing substantive criminal law to evolve as 
underlying assumptions change. Take, for example, the federal Gun Free 
School Zones Act, which contains a clear prohibition against possessing a 
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firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, subject to narrow defenses that are also 
clearly spelled out.271 To carry a firearm in a school zone, law enforcement 
officers must be on official duty, and private citizens generally need a license 
to carry from the state in which the school zone is located.272 The precision 
of the Act has caused it to become overbroad as subsequent developments in 
state and federal gun laws have created policy conflicts. Federal law now 
allows off-duty and retired law enforcement officers to carry their weapons 
off-duty throughout the country,273 most states allow adults to carry firearms 
in some manner without a license,274 and most states have some recognition 
of out-of-state weapons permits.275 If enforced to the maximum, the Act 
would prohibit the public carrying of firearms in most urban and suburban 
areas by these individuals. Yet, in the Act’s thirty years of existence, state 
prosecutors have not referred such cases for federal prosecution, and federal 
prosecutors have not made any effort to target these groups. What few 
recorded decisions exist show that the Act has been primarily used as an 
additional charge for those who commit other crimes in school zones.276 This 
is a significant narrowing of the statute. 
Yet again, this narrowing does not simply reflect the exercise of 
enforcement discretion. The question for whether something is a 
“convention,” as opposed to an act of discretion, depends on whether the 
relevant official has an obligation to respect the norm. The pertinent question 
is whether, for example, a U.S. Attorney (or an Assistant U.S. Attorney) 
could decide to prosecute police officers for carrying their service weapons 
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off duty. The answer is no—and obviously so. As Bellin notes,277 a 
prosecution requires the concurrence of other people—law enforcement 
officers to make the arrest, a grand jury to indict, a petit jury to convict, and 
support (or at least noninterference) from politically-accountable officers. A 
U.S. Attorney who tried prosecuting such a case would likely come under 
such intense scrutiny that he would be forced to drop the case. It is true that 
in some formal sense a prosecutor may have the power to prosecute for a 
technical violation. But that statement is like saying that the British monarch 
could veto a bill against the wishes of Parliament and the government. What 
is true in a formal legal sense may nevertheless be erroneous as a matter of 
customary norms—norms that are enforced indirectly through the political 
process rather than directly through the legal system. 
As with formal common law, unwritten criminal law conventions 
evolve over time.278 To give an illustrative example, let me go back to felon-
in-possession offenses. The de facto expansion of federal criminal law into 
weapons possession, a traditional state area, did not become a core part of 
federal criminal law until at least the late 1970s and arguably the late 1980s. 
The federal government statutorily began regulating the trafficking of 
ordinary firearms in 1938279 and first prohibited felons from receiving 
firearms in interstate commerce in 1961.280 But those statutes did not change 
the substantive criminal law reality. Federal prosecution of gun crimes 
remained uncommon until around 1990.281 Federal weapons prosecutions 
rose steeply during the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush presidencies, 
trailed off for a bit during the early Clinton years, and then rose quickly 
during the end of President Clinton’s second term and President George W. 
Bush’s first term.282 
And similar to the evolution of formal common law, many conventions 
evolve because someone violated an old convention. This was true with the 
 
 277 Bellin, Power of Prosecutors, supra note 25, at 181–82. 
 278 See Sachs, supra note 195, at 548–52. 
 279 Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938). Four years earlier, Congress 
regulated the highly destructive weapons. National Firearms Act (NFA), ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 
(1934). 
 280 An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 
(1961). See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009). 
 281 Between 1966 and 1968, only two hundred seventy-eight arrests were made for Federal 
Firearms Act violations. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control 
Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 142 (1975); see also WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, 
supra note 170 (providing data from 1980 onward); FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE, 
supra note 241(providing data from 1986 onward). 
 282 FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE, supra note 241, at tbl.1. 
2021] THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME 449 
federalization of state gun crimes, which was met with vociferous 
complaints. In 1997, the federal government implemented “Project Exile” in 
Richmond, Virginia, which diverted state weapons charges into federal 
court.283 At the time, Richmond’s murder rate was one of the country’s 
highest.284 One federal judge wrote a letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist 
complaining that Project Exile had “transformed [the district court] into a 
minor-grade police court.”285 And without mentioning specific programs, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly complained about the federalization of 
crime throughout the 1990s.286 But repeated violation of one norm can create 
a new norm, and in the case of guns, substantial federalization stuck. By 
1999, stronger prosecution of federal gun laws had bipartisan support, the 
support of the executive branch, and the support of state officials.287 George 
W. Bush made the expansion of federal prosecutions a part of his platform,288 
which he implemented when elected.289 Today, felon-in-possession cases 
compose a large fraction of the federal criminal docket. Sustained resistance 
against an old convention can spark a new convention. 
The federal policing of sex offenses also shows how shifts in popular 
customs can alter the common law of crime—this time, in favor of 
decriminalization. In 1910, Congress enacted the Mann Act, which 
prohibited transporting in interstate or foreign commerce “any woman or girl 
for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral 
purpose.”290 The Act “was aggressively used in the 1910s and 1920s to 
combat prostitution and even fornication.”291 But as American sexual mores 
changed, prosecutions diminished. Beginning in the 1930s, prosecutors faced 
jurors who harbored more liberal attitudes towards consensual sex; and as 
convictions for consensual, noncommercial sex became more difficult to 
obtain, prosecutors filed Mann Act charges based on that conduct less 
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frequently.292 The Act “was nearly a dead letter by the 1960s.”293 Since then, 
federal prosecution of sex crimes has not ended, but shifted. Today, nearly 
3% of the federal criminal docket comprises child pornography cases,294 and 
the federal government routinely prosecutes sex trafficking cases.295 This 
corresponds well to the shift in popular norms, which today recognize the 
gravity of sexual abuse while accepting the legitimacy of consensual sex. 
Mann Act prosecutions, thus, ultimately depended upon widely shared 
cultural norms about the criminalization of sex. When societal norms 
changed, prosecutors were bound to follow, and they faced indirect sanctions 
(e.g., jury nullification) if they did not. Broad criminal statutes provided a 
basis for federal criminal jurisdiction across a range of possible cases, but the 
effective scope of those statutes depended on customary norms, which 
changed over time. 
Today, we continue to see evolution in criminal law conventions. The 
possession of marijuana for personal use is becoming decriminalized.296 The 
federal government usually does not prosecute such cases, and increasingly, 
state prosecutors do not either.297 Serious hate crimes, in contrast, are being 
shifted to federal prosecutors, who may seek harsher federal sentences 
including the death penalty.298 These trends follow broader social trends, 
which show increasing sensitivity to bias-motivated wrongdoing and more 
libertarian leanings on personal drug use.299 How far the federal government 
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will assume hate-crimes prosecutions or drug crimes will become 
decriminalized remains to be seen. 
Finally, much like formal common law, criminal law conventions are 
not purely democratic. They need a broader social consensus than a weak 
democratic majority to be binding and effective. For example, look at the 
death penalty. Abolitionists are in the minority, even in some liberal states.300 
California voters have repeatedly voted to maintain the death penalty. In 
1972, California voters overturned the state supreme court’s abolition of the 
death penalty301 with 67.5% of the vote.302 Two recent propositions to 
overturn the death penalty have failed by simple majorities.303 Polls show 
that Californians support the death penalty by a substantial majority.304 And 
jurors return death sentences, with more than 700 inmates awaiting 
execution.305 Yet, California has had only thirteen executions since capital 
punishment’s reinstatement, and none since 2006.306 The California governor 
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has recently called a moratorium.307 Likewise, ten other states have not 
executed anyone in more than a decade.308 And this despite majority support 
for the death penalty.309 Criminal law is difficult to enforce when society is 
intensely divided. 
In giving these examples, I do not purport to offer a comprehensive 
account of what conventional criminal law actually is. That would be an 
exercise in treatise writing. My goal here is only to show that criminal law 
conventions exist—that is, that much of what comes within so-called 
“prosecutorial discretion” results from obligatory customs that are indirectly 
enforced. Modern substantive criminal law is heavily a law of unwritten 
conventions, and these unwritten conventions function much like common 
law. They are public norms that are widely understood, that evolve, and that 
gain their legitimacy from general public consensus. These conventions 
constrain actors in the criminal justice system, including prosecutors who, on 
paper, may have near-absolute discretion to bring or decline charges. 
Finally, the adaptation of statutory law into a de facto customary law 
results in a different kind of common law than the modern view of the 
common law. The post-legal realist vision of the common law, which Hessick 
and Kahan seem to accept,310 is that judges promulgate the law through their 
rulings.311 But there is an older, more traditional vision of the common law, 
which recognizes the law as a binding form of custom that society can 
generally recognize even though no one has promulgated it.312 Modern 
substantive criminal law remains a heavily customary enterprise in this older 
sense. To be sure, contemporary criminal law customs are not formally 
legally binding in a court of law as the common law is. But they nevertheless 
share many traits analogous to the pre-realist vision of the common law: the 
existence of customs widely accepted by the public and by those in authority, 
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considered as binding as a matter of public morality, and defined without the 
need for formal promulgation by a person acting with legislative or judicial 
authority. 
Thus, this Part has argued that criminal law consists heavily of 
unwritten, conventional norms. Among other things, these norms demarcate 
the line between criminal and noncriminal conduct, narrow the effective 
scope of broad criminal crimes, and divide federal and state criminal 
jurisdictions. And the conversion of statutory law into conventional law 
provides continued legitimacy for criminal law statutes, as the connection 
between the population and the legislatures who approved such laws weaken 
over time. The next Part will explain how criminal law conventions develop. 
III. REACHING EQUILIBRIUM: HOW DO CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS 
DEVELOP? 
On paper, prosecutors have enormous discretion. Yet, they lack the de 
facto power to use much of that discretion to impose their personal criminal 
justice preferences against greater societal norms. Why? Building on work 
by Brown, Richman, Bellin, and others, I argue that prosecutors face 
extensive checks and balances on how they exercise their power. Politically, 
prosecutors are pressured by the legislature and the electorate, both of whom 
demand that prosecutors punish core crimes but not overbroad crimes. 
Within the court system, prosecutors face pressure from judges, who have 
formal and informal tools to discourage prosecutors from being too harsh or 
too lenient. Prosecutors also face political pressure from different levels of 
government: overcriminalization and cooperative federalism combine to 
make it difficult for prosecutors to punish too little or too much. For 
prosecutors who try to criminalize too much, any individual prosecution is 
ultimately answerable to a jury, who may be reluctant to convict those who 
have not breached societal norms. Even though few cases go to trial today, 
the mere threat of a jury cabins how prosecutors exercise their power. As a 
result of all these checks, true substantive criminal law is largely determined 
by societal conventions, not prosecutors’ private preferences. This section 
will now explain how competing pressures from legislatures, elections, 
jurors, judges, and federalism combine to cabin prosecutorial discretion and 
create a common law of crime. 
A. LEGISLATURES 
As explained in Part II, legal conventions differ from formal law in that 
conventions rely on indirect means for their enforcement. Instead of culling 
the statute books, legislatures routinely use indirect means to curb broad 
statutory law and to sanction executive officials who violate customary 
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enforcement norms. One method is through budgetary decisions. 
Legislatures can decriminalize conduct by cutting off funds to prosecutors 
and enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution.313 Or 
legislatures can limit an enforcement agency’s budget, leaving it unable to 
investigate and prosecute trivial offenses.314 
Legislatures also prevent excessive enforcement by directly or 
indirectly controlling enforcement agencies. For example, legislatures can 
restrict how enforcement agencies gather and use information needed for an 
investigation, such as by prohibiting enforcement agencies from using 
computer searches or by banning investigators from using wiretaps.315 And 
legislators conduct oversight of prosecutorial decisions.316 
Legislatures also use political sanctions against the executive to prevent 
excessive enforcement.317 For example, Congress blocked certain Justice 
Department nominations to prevent what some Senators viewed as excessive 
federal drug enforcement.318 In 2009, President Obama’s Justice Department 
responded to the increased legalization of medical marijuana in the states by 
instructing the U.S. Attorneys in those jurisdictions not to prosecute 
“individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with 
existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”319 The 
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Department of Justice expanded this guidance in 2013 to eschew 
enforcement of marijuana possession in states that legalized it for 
recreational use.320 Five years later, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded 
the memo.321 The revocation caused an immediate backlash from members 
of Congress. Senator Cory Gardner, a Republican from Colorado—a state 
that had legalized recreational marijuana—responded by blocking the 
confirmation of about twenty D.O.J. nominees.322 The standoff ended three 
months later when the President assured Senator Gardner that the Department 
of Justice would not interfere with Colorado’s legal marijuana industry and 
that the Administration would support marijuana reform.323 President 
Trump’s next Attorney General, William Barr, pledged in writing to Senators 
during his confirmation that he would abide by the terms of the 2013 
memo.324 Thus, legislatures can create de facto decriminalization by raising 
the political price of enforcement beyond what the executive is willing to 
pay.325 
When public prosecutors persist in overzealously enforcing statutes, 
legislatures can respond by narrowing them. In 1968, Congress passed the 
Gun Control Act, which, in part, made it a crime to knowingly engage in the 
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business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license.326 During the 
early 1980s, Congress held extensive hearings on the Act’s enforcement.327 
Many members concluded that, instead of targeting violent criminals, the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had targeted legitimate gun 
owners by prosecuting trivial technical violations.328 Congress responded by 
raising the mens rea to “willful[ness]” for most Gun Control Act violations 
and narrowing the definition of those who are “engaged in the business” of 
firearms.329 Congress left the mens rea at “knowingly” for the felon-in-
possession provision and for making a false statement to gun dealers.330 
Congress’s investigation and disapproval of the ATF’s enforcement 
decisions sent the message that Congress disagreed with the ATF’s 
enforcement priorities. The Bureau received the message. For the past twenty 
years, the Bureau has primarily prosecuted people for unlawful possession of 
a firearm.331 There have been a few prosecutions each year for unlawful 
dealing, but not many.332 The ATF has been timid in its enforcement against 
gun dealers who break the Gun Control Act—hesitant even to revoke their 
licenses.333 
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449 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21). 
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796–98 (noting how legislative oversight and the ATF’s political weakness checks the 
Bureau’s enforcement). 
2021] THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME 457 
This is just one of many examples where legislatures use their statutory 
power to control excessive enforcement. Congress also maintains a 
willfulness requirement in tax prosecution cases, even though it makes 
federal prosecutions difficult against tax evaders who “genuinely,” but 
unreasonably, believe that the federal income tax is unconstitutional or that 
their wages do not constitute income.334 In civil cases, Congress flipped the 
burden of proof from the taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and 
also made it easier for taxpayers to sue the IRS for damages.335 State 
legislatures restrict excessive enforcement, too. Pennsylvania prohibits its 
local police from using radar guns to enforce speeding violations because the 
legislature is afraid that municipalities will use excessive enforcement to 
raise revenue.336 Spurred by the arrest of a twelve-year-old girl for eating a 
french fry in a metro station, the D.C. City Council reformed the city’s 
juvenile delinquency law to allow police to cite juveniles instead of arresting 
them.337 
Indeed, public prosecutors likely maintain their monopoly over criminal 
prosecutions because we expect them not to prosecute trivial or blameless 
cases.338 In early America, private prosecutors brought most criminal 
complaints.339 One familiar quasi-criminal mode of prosecution was the qui 
tam suit, in which a private informer split the penalty with the government. 
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203–05 (1991). 
 335 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
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But private prosecutions produced undesirably high levels of enforcement,340 
and they have been largely abandoned. 
Thus, it is not true that “when law enforcers are happier, so are 
lawmakers.”341 Even where legislatures confer broad authority on police and 
prosecutors, they expect the executive branch to exercise its discretion 
appropriately. And legislatures take either prophylactic or corrective action 
when they do not trust the executive to abide by the norms. The threat of 
these corrective actions helps maintain criminal law conventions. 
Stuntz is correct that political factors incentivize legislatures to 
proscribe too much conduct rather than too little, but this is not inherently a 
bad thing. With respect to redundancy, overlapping criminal statutes with 
different penalty provisions, gives prosecutors the ability to tailor 
punishments to crimes,342 including by showing mercy where warranted.343 
As for overbreadth, it is much easier for prosecutors to forgo prosecuting 
some conduct than to try to stretch a statute unnaturally to cover other forms 
of misconduct that society desires to be punished.344 The use of broad and 
vague statutes is not inherently problematic if sufficient checks curtail 
prosecutors’ statutory power to punish nonblameworthy conduct. 
Prosecutorial abuse does not occur solely by prosecuting too many 
cases; prosecutors also can abuse their discretion by failing to adequately 
enforce the law.345 Although “[t]he prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a 
case is virtually unreviewable,”346 legislatures are sensitive to 
underenforcement. If prosecutors are too lenient or lack resources, 
legislatures can respond by decentralizing enforcement. Congress passed the 
False Claims Act in 1863,347 which authorized qui tam suits for treble 
damages against those who defraud the government. Those provisions 
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remain popular with key members of Congress, who guard the decentralized 
authority against government prosecutors.348 Decentralized enforcement 
exists in the criminal context as well. State legislatures can authorize police 
or victims to prosecute cases directly.349 And legislatures can authorize 
multiple government officers—say, the Attorney General and the local 
prosecutor or multiple local prosecutors with overlapping jurisdiction—to 
bring charges, thereby depriving a single prosecutor of a monopoly on the 
authority to prosecute.350 In addition to decentralizing enforcement, 
legislatures can limit the ability of prosecutors to plea or charge bargain, if 
they believe that prosecutors are abusing that power.351 
Recently, the Pennsylvania General Assembly decentralized 
enforcement for gun crimes in Philadelphia.352 As described more fully 
below, Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia district attorney, has been under fire 
for lenient plea bargains in cases involving violent crimes and gun crimes.353 
In response, the legislature gave the Pennsylvania Attorney General 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute unlawful gun possession and the 
unlawful transfer of firearms arising in Philadelphia.354 Prosecutors, thus, are 
not mini-sovereigns, and even their ability to show leniency has limits. 
B. ELECTIONS 
Elections also serve to cabin prosecutorial power within a reasonable 
range.355 Most district attorneys and state attorneys general are elected.356 
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These officers remain attuned to popular will because they want to continue 
in their current positions or they have ambitions for higher office.357 
Prosecutors who are not elected—most notably U.S. Attorneys—are 
generally politically sensitive for two reasons. First, they serve at the 
discretion of an elected office holder.358 Second, many U.S. Attorneys have 
ambitions for higher elected office or want to become judges, which requires 
the support of elected officials.359 
For reasons well-explained, voters’ preferences make it difficult for 
prosecutors to be too lenient. Many crimes—especially violent felonies—are 
“politically mandatory” for prosecutors to pursue.360 Notwithstanding 
overcriminalization, 60% of state prisoners are imprisoned for one of the 
traditional common law felonies, including murder, manslaughter, rape, or 
robbery.361 Voters’ preferences substantially reduce the amount of de facto 
discretion prosecutors have when it comes to prosecuting serious mala in se 
crimes. 
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Lenient prosecution policies can also frustrate law enforcement officers, 
who will take their frustration to the voters.362  A prosecutor’s refusal to 
prosecute can “expose police to media backlash and public outcry.”363 So, 
police pressure prosecutors to file charges when they have made arrests.364 
Thus, after a spate of shootings, the Philadelphia Police Commissioner 
indirectly suggested that Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia District Attorney, 
had not been seeking adequate penalties when prosecuting gun violations.365 
Krasner disputed the allegation,366 but the local press has begun tracking his 
performance in gun cases.367 Likewise, when Cook County State’s Attorney 
Kimberly Foxx dropped charges against Jussie Smollett for falsely reporting 
a hate crime, she received blistering criticism from the Mayor and the Police 
Superintendent.368 Ultimately, a special prosecutor reindicted Smollett about 
a month before Foxx faced reelection.369 A central issue in the election was 
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Attorney’s Race, WGN (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:50 AM), https://wgntv.com/2020/02/12/new-
smollett-indictment-may-shape-cook-county-states-attorneys-race/ [https://perma.cc/8S5D-X
W42]. 
462 LEIDER [Vol. 111 
whether Foxx properly handled the case in the first place.370 Foxx won 
reelection, but the incident caused political damage.371 
Electoral pressure also helps discipline career prosecutors. Although 
most prosecutors are career civil servants who are not directly accountable to 
the voters, their bad decisions can create political headaches for their bosses. 
For example, in Philadelphia, a prosecutor offered a three-to-ten-year plea 
for an armed robber who shot a store owner with an AK-47.372 Even though 
the public elected Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner on a 
progressive decriminalization platform, the deal went too far. After severe 
negative publicity, Krasner unsuccessfully tried to revoke the deal and, going 
forward, the office reaffirmed internal policies that require supervisor 
approval of plea deals.373 
Some have objected that prosecutorial elections do not accurately 
measure prosecutorial performance. As Stephanos Bibas explains, many 
prosecutorial elections are low-information, low-turnout events in which 
anecdotes or misleading statistics may have outsized influence.374 The public 
may fail to notice isolated aberrations in prosecutorial decision-making.375 
Moreover, incumbency can prove an insurmountable advantage.376 Election 
results do not inherently reward good prosecutors and remove bad ones. 
Still, the threat of elections provides some discipline for prosecutors. In 
a low-information environment, prosecutors seek to avoid negative publicity, 
which too much leniency easily produces.377 Victims of serious crimes who 
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do not get adequate justice will go to the press.378 And too much tolerance 
for minor crimes can erode quality of life.379 
Elections are not only an important check against excessive leniency; 
they also help prevent overcriminalization. Prosecutors already lack 
sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute all core crimes; many 
murders and most rapes, robberies, burglaries, and car thefts go unsolved.380 
Given these limitations, if a prosecutor desired to prosecute adultery or an 
office March Madness pool, it would likely create a public relations disaster. 
Public pressure also can provide a modest check against arbitrary 
enforcement, at least in high-profile cases.381 
Local elections are also susceptible to special interest capture, which 
can reward the refusal to enforce laws that are deeply unpopular among a 
passionate minority. Executive officials in many liberal cities have declared 
themselves “sanctuary cities” in which they have refused to detain unlawfully 
present aliens or provide assistance to federal agencies enforcing 
immigration laws.382 Not to be outdone, many conservative localities refuse 
to enforce new gun-control laws.383 Even if the gun-control laws are 
supported by an electoral majority within the jurisdiction, sometimes elected 
officials will gain more votes by going along with intensely held special-
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interest views than they will lose by acceding to weakly held majoritarian 
beliefs. Elections help make criminal law conventions more consensus driven 
than purely majoritarian. 
Finally, the public’s preference for law-and-order politics may not be as 
static as once assumed. In recent elections, progressive candidates have won 
several local prosecutorial elections on promises to prosecute less.384 Even 
national presidential candidates have faced difficult questions about their 
law-and-order records.385 When crime rates are low and people feel safe, they 
may be more sensitive to claims that the justice system is too harsh. Electoral 
politics are now moderating criminal law. The fact that most local 
prosecutors are elected arguably backs these decriminalization decisions with 
democratic legitimacy.386 
Thus, electoral oversight helps cabin prosecutorial discretion. In a low-
turnout, low-information election, the worst thing a prosecutor can do is stir 
up passionate hatred among a significant constituency. Prosecutors are 
incentivized to prosecute core crimes, but not waste resources on overbroad 
application of criminal laws that lack public support. 
C. JURORS 
Juries act “as a lay buffer . . . ‘against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor.’”387 Jurors, as community members unlearned in the law, 
arguably have a comparative advantage in deciding whether someone ought 
to be punished, notwithstanding the technicalities of the criminal law.388 
Jurors can check excessive prosecutions in different ways. Their most 
extreme power is to nullify—that is, to refuse to convict despite a belief in 
guilt. Jurors do this in at least two circumstances: first, when they believe the 
underlying conduct is not blameworthy; and, second, when they are aware 
that the penalties are too high relative to the blameworthiness of the 
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offense.389 English juries, thus, refused to convict Protestant dissenters, 
undervalued stolen loot in larceny cases,390 and refused to condemn those 
who violated a statute punishing the exportation of wool with death.391 Even 
today, prosecutors worry about jurors exercising their power to acquit. 
Recently, for example, federal prosecutors received mandamus against a 
district judge, who had ruled that the defendant could tell the jury that he 
faced a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence if convicted of a statutory 
sex offense.392 Obviously, the prosecutor would not have been concerned—
and certainly not to the level of seeking a trial stay and mandamus—if he 
thought that the jury would view the crime as sufficiently blameworthy to 
merit a fifteen-year sentence. More broadly, the decision to seek mandamus 
shows that prosecutors strongly oppose giving juries sentencing information. 
But jurors need not resort to full nullification to affect criminal 
prosecutions. Sympathetic jurors are also more likely to actually believe that 
reasonable doubt exists.393 And even jurors who favor harsh criminal 
penalties in the abstract may hesitate to convict once faced with a particular 
defendant.394 
Although jurors in theory form an important buffer between a defendant 
and the state, in practice, the role of jurors has been greatly diminished 
because jury trials have almost disappeared.395 In recent years, only 2–3% of 
federal defendants had their cases resolved by a jury trial.396  State jury trials 
are similarly rare. One study sampling sixteen jurisdictions found that juries 
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resolved 1.1% of criminal cases in 2009.397 A Bureau of Justice Statistics 
sampling showed that 98% of felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas, 
with only 2% coming from jury trials.398 And in 2012, the Supreme Court 
reported that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four 
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”399 Moreover, the 
function of juries in trials has been reduced to that of a factfinder applying 
the law given by the judge; under the modern view, they are not supposed to 
interpret the law on their own or act as judges of normative guilt.400 
Despite the rarity of jury trials, though, the mere possibility of 
presenting a case to a jury has a significant constraining influence on 
prosecutors. In a recent ethnographic study of federal prosecutors, assistant 
U.S. Attorneys explained that their beliefs about how jurors would view cases 
affected the investigation methods they employed, their decisions whether to 
pursue charges or decline prosecution, and what plea offers they decided to 
make.401 Prosecutors made their decisions, among other things, on 
perceptions of how the jury would view the defendant, the victims, the 
witnesses, and the significance of the charges.402 Prosecutors, for example, 
described their dislike of bringing technical regulatory prosecutions for 
crimes such as structuring, unless they could tie those crimes to broader 
wrongdoing.403 Those findings confirm what prosecutors say and do 
elsewhere. A recent interview with a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives official explained that the Bureau has difficulty prosecuting 
unlicensed gun sellers because many have no criminal records, which makes 
jurors hesitant to convict.404 Prosecution records confirm this preference. 
Between Fiscal Years 2008–2017, U.S. Attorneys brought about 1,500 
prosecutions where unlicensed gun dealing was the lead charge,405 while they 
 
 397 Offit, supra note 14, at 1075 (citing VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS M. CLARKE, 
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 398 Id. 
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 402 Id. at 1088–99. 
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brought about 60,000 prosecutions against prohibited persons (e.g., felons) 
for possessing firearms.406 
Thus, even in a world where nearly all cases are plea bargained, juries 
(or the threat of jury trials) play a significant role in determining the scope of 
modern substantive criminal law. For a plea bargain to happen, there must be 
a mutual exchange. A defendant gives up his trial rights in exchange for a 
lower sentence; the prosecutor, in turn, gains an easy conviction without the 
cost of going to trial or needing to worry whether the evidence will be 
sufficient to sustain a conviction. A prosecutor who pursues a case in which 
the jury likely will not convict, regardless of the evidence, has little leverage 
with which to bargain. Under these circumstances, jury pressures incentivize 
prosecutors to pursue the kinds of wrongdoing which jurors will convict if 
there is a trial. Even as prosecutors now operate “in the shadow of the 
jury,”407 the threat of jury trials contributes to developing an unwritten 
conventional law of crime. 
D. JUDGES 
The judiciary also plays a critical role in developing criminal law 
conventions. Law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges are all repeat players 
in the criminal justice system. Actions taken by police and prosecutors that 
exceed customary norms may invite pushback from the judiciary, even if 
police and prosecutors’ actions are technically within the law. 
Judges have a wide variety of tools to limit prosecutorial abuse. Judges 
wield ultimate power over statutory interpretation, and they use it to cabin 
the scope of vague and overbroad laws.408 Judges, first, narrow criminal 
statutes through their interpretation of mens rea requirements. In statutes that 
omit a mens rea element, judges often supply it.409 Judges can increase the 
prosecution’s burden of proof by interpreting statutory mens rea 
requirements to apply not just to the actus reus but also to the attendant 
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 407 See generally Offit, supra note 14. 
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 409 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (requiring the government to 
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circumstances.410 And judges can narrow statutes by strengthening the 
meaning of mens rea requirements.411 
Judges also can narrow the actus reus using a variety of statutory 
interpretive tools. For example, based on federalism concerns and 
constitutional avoidance principles, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 when 
prosecutors used the provision to charge a woman for spreading toxic 
chemicals to injure her husband’s paramour.412 Later, using various 
interpretive canons (e.g., noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis), the Court 
narrowed the definition of “tangible object” in a Sarbanes-Oxley evidence 
destruction provision when a U.S. Attorney prosecuted a fisherman for 
throwing illegal fish overboard.413 And concerned about the scope of honest 
services fraud and the Hobbs Act’s official bribery provisions, the Supreme 
Court whittled both crimes down to their most basic forms of wrongdoing.414 
In a few jurisdictions, legislatures have even delegated to judges some 
power over prosecutorial discretion. Fifteen states have adopted statutes 
permitting courts to dismiss prosecutions in the interests of justice.415 Hawaii, 
Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have adopted section 2.12 of the 
Model Penal Code, which authorizes judges to dismiss prosecutions for “de 
minimis infractions.”416 De minimis infractions include criminal conduct that 
is (1) “within a customary license or tolerance,” (2) “did not actually cause 
or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented . . . [or caused the harm] 
 
 410 See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (requiring the 
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prosecution for structuring). 
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 415 Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2017). 
 416 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-236 (2020); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 12 (2020); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 (West 2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 312 (2020); see generally 
Douglas Husak, The De Minimis “Defense” to Criminal Liability, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 362, 367 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2010). 
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only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction,” or 
(3) “presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded 
as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.”417 These are factors 
that prosecutors should consider when deciding whether to bring charges. So, 
in these jurisdictions, courts have some residual power to check a 
prosecutor’s decision to bring charges in trivial cases. 
Judges have various soft-power tools, as well. Trial judges can express 
their disapproval of certain prosecutions and encourage prosecutors to drop 
charges or plead them out as lesser offenses.418 Like prosecutors, judges face 
docket pressures and prosecuting trivial cases is a poor use of judicial 
resources.419 Although judges may not be able to stop a determined 
prosecutor from bringing charges, line prosecutors are repeat players who are 
incentivized not to anger the judges that they will appear before. 
Appellate judges have soft-power tools, too. They can express their 
disapproval of the statute or the prosecution in the hopes that policymakers 
take note.420 They can also issue threats to narrow the scope of statutes by 
how they interpret the mens rea or actus reus requirements.421 These tools do 
not correct all bad prosecutions, but they do send a message about the 
judiciary’s tolerance for abusive prosecutions. 
Sometimes, soft-power persuasion is not sufficient to restrain 
prosecutorial excess, but statutory interpretation tools are too strong. 
Between these two options lies a third way that judges control prosecutorial 
excess: using minor technical reasons to reverse convictions that, for less 
sympathetic defendants, would not merit reversal. The Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Abair is a good example.422 The case involved a 
prosecution for structuring. Abair, a Russian immigrant, had purchased a 
home. Her Russian bank refused to transfer Abair’s money to her American 
bank account because her Russian account was in her maiden name, while 
her American account was in her married name.423 So, Abair decided to 
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withdraw the money in small amounts from ATMs, which she deposited into 
her American account. Because she transferred more than $10,000 in small 
increments, the government prosecuted her for structuring.424 The Seventh 
Circuit reversed her conviction, holding that the government asked an 
improper impeachment question when cross-examining Abair.425 The 
rationale for reversing the conviction was weak,426 but it had the desired 
effect: the U.S. Attorney’s Office did not retry the case.427 
Judges have some tools to combat prosecutorial leniency, though not as 
many. Judges can refuse to accept plea bargains or, where plea bargained 
sentences are nonbinding, subject defendants to higher sentences.428 
Philadelphia judges, for example, have already started pushing back on the 
new district attorney’s leniency by rejecting pleas of juvenile offenders 
originally sentenced to life in prison.429 Most states also require a judge’s 
approval to dismiss a prosecution after a prosecutor decides to file charges.430 
And at the extreme outer perimeter of judicial power, where prosecutors 
refuse to charge defendants, judges in some jurisdictions can appoint special 
prosecutors to try the case—although this raises obvious separation of 
powers concerns.431 
E. FEDERALISM 
In criminal law, federalism is intertwined with overcriminalization.432 
Congress has expanded federal criminal law to cover traditional state 
 
 424 Id. at 262. 
 425 Id. at 265–66. 
 426 Id. at 269–70 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 427 United States v. Abair, No. 3:12-CR-00076 (N.D. Ind. May 9, 2014) (dkt. 112) 
(dismissing indictment). 
 428 Darryl Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 63, 81 (2017) [hereinafter Brown, Judicial Role]; Daniel S. McConkie, 
Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 66–67 (2015). For an 
example of a judge with a policy against plea bargaining, see United States v. Walker, 922 
F.3d 239, 251 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds. 
 429 Samantha Melamed, Philly Judges Block DA Krasner’s Deals for Juvenile Lifers 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/krasner-juvenile-
lifer-judge-rejecting-deals-20180406.html [https://perma.cc/KM77-MXYV]. 
 430 Misner, supra note 5, at 749. 
 431 See Brown, Judicial Role, supra note 428, at 73–76; see also, Marlena Baldacci, Elliot 
C. McLaughlin, & Jen Goelz, Judge Stands by Decision to Appoint Special Prosecutor in 
Jussie Smollett Case, CNN (July 31, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/31/us/ju
ssie-smollett-judge-prosecutor-motions-denied/index.html [https://perma.cc/8PSQ-KRYU]. 
 432 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995) (describing the consequences of having 
substantive federal criminal law heavily duplicate state law). 
2021] THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME 471 
crimes.433 Today, defendants are subject to two nearly coextensive criminal 
law codes.434 Federal prosecutors lack the resources to punish all state crime. 
So, U.S. Attorneys effectively set federal criminal law by selecting which 
offenses to prosecute.435 And federal prosecutors can divert defendants into 
the federal system where they generally face harsher penalties. 
Less appreciated, however, is that duplicative criminalization serves as 
a check against idiosyncratic prosecutorial preferences. Duplicative criminal 
codes check prosecutorial leniency. Take the case in Philadelphia, for 
example, where the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office offered a three-
to-ten-year plea deal for the armed robber who shot a store owner with an 
AK-47. In response, the U.S. Attorney indicted the defendant for Hobbs Act 
robbery and for using a firearm during a crime of violence.436 That defendant 
now faces a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.437 Similarly, before 
the state trial court appointed a special prosecutor, a federal investigation was 
underway in Chicago after state prosecutors dropped charges against Jussie 
Smollett for allegedly faking a hate crime against himself.438 In economic 
terms, the failure by one prosecutor to serve the market invites entry by other 
market participants. 
Relatedly, duplicative criminalization checks the ability of prosecutors 
to show leniency that may accord with local democratic majorities.439 During 
the 1960s, when southern officials would not indict for racially-motivated 
violence, the Department of Justice did, using federal civil rights charges.440 
The Boston Marathon bomber received a federal death sentence, even though 
Massachusetts abolished the death penalty in 1984 and has repeatedly voted 
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against reinstating it.441 And the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act permits federal prosecutions for hate crimes but only 
after the Attorney General certifies that a state prosecution would be 
ineffective to do justice.442 Duplicative federal–state criminalization means 
that enforcement of criminal law is not solely “local representation applying 
local standards to the enforcement of essentially local laws.”443 And, to 
restate an earlier point, it is one reason why I take no firm position on whether 
the conventional law of crime is local or national; it is likely some of both. 
Excessive harshness or leniency also can provoke state and local 
governments to engage in “uncooperative federalism.”444 Federal and state 
prosecutors are interdependent. State governments have far more police, 
investigators, and prosecutors than the federal government.445 The federal 
government often uses these resources.446 But states also depend on the 
federal government. The federal government has sophisticated investigative 
resources that are often unavailable to state or local officials, such as witness 
protection, forensic laboratories, and nationwide fingerprint analysis.447 The 
federal government also controls law enforcement grants.448 Prosecutors who 
defy norms can create tension in this necessary relationship. When the Trump 
 
 441 MASS. GEN. LAWS 265 § 2 (2020); An Act Relative to Juvenile Sentences for First 
Degree Murder, ch. 189, H.B. 4307, 2014. Legis. Serv. (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v. 
Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 1990) (striking down death penalty statute); 
Massachusetts Again Votes Overwhelmingly Against Reinstating Death Penalty, DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Nov. 16, 2007), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2216 
[https://perma.cc/22GN-Y6UQ] (tracking votes against reinstating the death penalty). See 
generally Brickey, supra note 432, at 1166–67 (“In enacting death penalty provisions for 
dozens of crimes, for example, Congress chose to override the decisions of fourteen states and 
the District of Columbia to ban capital punishment.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 442 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1) (allowing certification when a state (1) lacks jurisdiction, (2) 
has requested a federal prosecution, or (3) has prosecuted the case but “the verdict or sentence 
obtained pursuant to State charges left demonstratively unvindicated the Federal interest in 
eradicating bias-motivated violence,” and (4) when “a prosecution by the United States is in 
the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice”). 
 443 JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 38 (1980). 
 444 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256 (2009). 
 445 Id. at 1280 (noting that “there are roughly ten times as many state and local full-time 
police officers as federal officers”); Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27, at 82 
(noting the “[f]ederal enforcement bureaucracy is still quite small, at least when compared 
with State and local authorities”). 
 446 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 444, at 1266–68. 
 447 Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27, at 95; Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and 
Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 
46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1009–10 & n.115 (1995). 
 448 See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 870, 882–84 (2015). 
2021] THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME 473 
Administration announced that it would take a harder line on immigration 
enforcement, many municipalities declared themselves “sanctuary cities” 
and refused to assist the federal government in detecting and detaining 
unlawful aliens.449 The Trump Administration, in turn, threatened to cut off 
federal funds to those cities.450 Ultimately, when breakdowns occur, both 
sides suffer. 
Given cooperative federalism, duplicative federal crimes should not be 
written off as merely symbolic actions; they also provide concurrent 
investigative jurisdiction for federal law enforcement agencies. Congress 
evades constitutional limits on its Commerce Clause power451 through 
minimal jurisdictional nexuses, such as a requirement that a gun cross state 
lines one time.452 As a result, many contemporary federal crimes (e.g., 
involving child exploitation, carjacking, or domestic violence) essentially 
duplicate state crimes. Even if the federal government does not intend to 
enforce these overlapping federal crimes, those offenses provide federal law 
enforcement agencies with jurisdiction to investigate, which they may use to 
aid state prosecutors.453 And more broadly, Congress’s failure to criminalize 
an offense can leave federal investigative jurisdiction in doubt. For example, 
when President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, murdering the president 
was not a federal offense. No doubt, the murder violated state law, and Lee 
Harvey Oswald would have been subject to the death penalty in Texas. The 
federal assassination statute, thus, was largely duplicative of state law.454 But 
the Warren Commission nevertheless pushed for a federal murder statute 
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because the FBI and the Secret Service did not have clearly established 
jurisdiction to investigate President Kennedy’s murder.455 
In theory, over-federalization can result in excessive harshness through 
duplicative federal–state prosecutions. In practice, this rarely happens. For 
decades, the Justice Department has maintained the “Petite Policy,” which 
precludes federal prosecutors from bringing a second prosecution for 
criminal conduct previously prosecuted in state court, subject to narrow 
exceptions where the state prosecution failed to vindicate “a compelling 
federal interest.”456 The fact that the policy has existed so long through 
different administrations with a variety of criminal justice policies provides 
some evidence that it is not merely an instantiation of the Attorney General’s 
private discretion. And a new Attorney General inclined to reverse the policy 
would face significant hurdles. Federal prosecutors lack the resources 
necessary to prosecute most state crimes.457 Federal judges, upset with 
burgeoning dockets, could issue sentences concurrent with state judgments, 
making the subsequent prosecution pointless. And duplicative prosecutions 
would discourage defendants in state cases from pleading guilty, placing 
pressure on state criminal justice systems.458 
Although federal prosecutors may have more discretion than their state 
counterparts, the scope of this discretion is often exaggerated. Much of a U.S. 
Attorney’s docket is still consumed with cases for which there is heavy 
political pressure to bring charges, albeit of a different sort than a state 
prosecutor’s mandatory docket.459 The vast majority of federal 
prosecutions—about four in five—are for immigration violations, drug 
trafficking, illegal gun possession, and fraud.460 About half of federal charges 
were brought under two federal laws for drug trafficking and illegal 
reentry.461 
Given our federal structure, we should be wary of claims that 
nonenforcement by one government somehow dilutes the moral message of 
the criminal law. Stuntz worried that Congress reduced the expressive 
function of punishment by legislating crimes that the executive would not 
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enforce.462 But nonenforcement by one level of government does not confer 
the same societal approval of actions that nonenforcement by all levels of 
government would have. Take Stuntz’s example of the Violence Against 
Women Act,463 which was part of the 1994 Crime Bill.464 Congress not only 
added a federal domestic violence crime, but also authorized other forms of 
federal assistance to protect against domestic violence. Congress allocated 
$1.6 billion in funds, provided for interstate recognition of protection orders, 
and, in another section of the 1994 Crime Bill, prohibited the possession of 
firearms by those subject to domestic violence restraining orders.465 These 
actions hardly correspond with a failure to take domestic violence seriously. 
Serious enforcement by one level of government is sufficient to send a moral 
message that society condemns an action. 
Despite vast statutory overcriminalization, various checks and balances 
control the criminal law through both formal and informal means. These 
controls, in turn, generate norms that prosecutors follow. Conventional 
norms narrow the reach of statutes, force other statutes to become 
desuetudinal, and divide the scope of federal and state criminal law. These 
norms check prosecutorial power when the majority tries to enact law over a 
passionate minority or when local majorities try to substantially alter criminal 
law norms widely held outside that community. Thus, viewing our 
substantive criminal law as primarily statutory ignores the complicated ways 
in which checks and balances mediate the substantive law around custom and 
tradition. Our substantive criminal law is neither primarily statutory nor 
delegated to prosecutors. In the next Part, I examine how our formal legal 
doctrine should accommodate a primarily conventional criminal law system. 
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DE FACTO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL 
SYSTEM 
That our modern criminal law is primarily a system of unwritten and 
informal conventions poses significant doctrinal challenges. In a 
conventional system, obligatory customs are not judicially enforceable. The 
enforcement of conventions, instead, relies on indirect means, such as 
political pressure. Yet, prosecutions take place in courts, so when prosecutors 
undertake actions that do not accord with community values, defendants 
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naturally seek judicial relief.466 The result is a formal legal doctrine detached 
from real-world criminal law practice, and it raises the question whether and 
how legal doctrine should bridge the gap. 
A. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE GAP BETWEEN DOCTRINAL AND DE 
FACTO CRIMINAL LAW 
The existence of a gap between statutory criminal law and the de facto 
law is not, by itself, serious cause for concern. An unwritten common law 
system can still respect traditional rule of law values of notice, clarity, and 
prospectivity by tracking widely understood societal norms and customs. 
Similarly, the existence of a de facto common law does not threaten rule-of-
law values if law enforcers respect criminal law conventions in their 
decisions to enforce or not enforce statutory criminal law. In British 
constitutional law, for example, respect for convention prevents the formal 
requirement of royal assent for legislation from imperiling democratic norms. 
Our system of criminal law conventions, however, falls short of this 
ideal for at least three reasons. First, prosecutors actually defect from legal 
conventions in some criminal cases. This makes criminal law conventions 
significantly different from those in British constitutional law, in which a 
defection would be highly visible and would trigger a constitutional crisis. 
Second, in some areas of criminal law—particularly in sentencing—norms 
have developed that are not public and not subject to the democratic checks 
that ensure their evenhanded application across defendants. These norms fall 
short of true legal conventions. Third, because formal law and conventions 
diverge, prosecutors can leverage broader statutory criminal law to 
circumvent traditional criminal procedure rights. 
1. Substantive Criminal Law 
The mismatch between formal legal rules and de facto conventional law 
creates the potential for arbitrary and excessive criminal liability. In a 
conventional criminal law system, no formal legal doctrine requires a 
prosecutor to abide by the commonly understood conventions. And 
sometimes prosecutors defect. 
For example, Rudy Giuliani instituted “federal day” for drug crimes 
when he was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.467 
Ordinarily, conventional rules determine which crimes are prosecuted in state 
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court and which are handled in federal court.468 But on federal day, federal 
prosecutors diverted all local drug cases to federal court, which imposes 
harsher penalties for drug crimes.469 To maximize deterrence, the U.S. 
Attorney’s office kept secret which day was federal day.470 
Defections from commonly understood norms create serious rule-of-
law problems. Some are obvious, such as the distributive justice principle 
that like cases should be treated alike. Giving a drug defendant a harsher 
sentence because he was caught on Monday rather than Tuesday is the apex 
of arbitrariness. 
But the rule-of-law problems with prosecutorial defections run deeper 
than just a failure of distributive justice. Defections can call into question the 
public’s shared understanding about what the law really is. People base their 
understandings of the legal system from their beliefs about shared practice, 
not from the words in a statute book.471 Unusual prosecutions unsettle the 
community’s shared understanding of the law, and, correlatively, they 
interfere with the basic requirements of clarity and prospectivity that underlie 
the rule of law.472 
Overbroad criminal laws also allow prosecutors to target individuals 
selectively. Virtually everyone commits a technical violation of some law.473 
The checks described in Part III mitigate much of that overcriminalization. 
But checks that work well in the aggregate do not necessarily work well in 
every individual case. So-called “contempt of cop” cases are one example. 
When police and prosecutors take offense, they often respond in 
disproportionate ways.474 Another example may be the trend among some 
federal prosecutors to find high-publicity cases to prosecute, which 
prosecutors may leverage for their future careers.475 A third example was the 
independent counsel statute, which incentivized the targeting of high-level 
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political officials.476 Criminal law conventions do not protect against isolated 
cases of selective targeting. And that is especially true for individuals who 
may be unsympathetic defendants or who are members of marginalized 
populations for whom political recourse may not be a viable option to check 
executive excess. 
2. Plea Bargaining and Sentencing 
Much of the worst overcriminalization problems involve excessive 
harshness against guilty defendants.477 A defendant’s sentence heavily 
depends on the charges selected by the prosecution and on the process of plea 
bargaining.478 This introduces a lot of arbitrariness into the process. For 
example, some jurisdictions may routinely prosecute three-strikes statutes, 
while others do not.479 Different jurisdictions—or even different prosecutors 
within a jurisdiction—can seek widely divergent sentences for the same 
criminal conduct.480 And state and federal prosecutors may jointly use the 
threat of severe (and redundant) federal penalties to compel guilty pleas.481 
A significant subset of these problems concerns sentences for plea-
bargained convictions. Although vast statutory sentencing ranges may leave 
questionable the precise sanction a defendant will face for violating a law, 
that uncertainty is reduced by the tendency of prosecutors and judges to have 
“going rates” for plea bargains within a jurisdiction.482 But the existence of 
“going rates” can have significant legitimacy problems. These rates are often 
not public, which means that lawyers who are repeat players have a 
significant information advantage.483 They also lack any real claim to 
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legitimacy. As a regular course of practice, these going rates may be 
“conventions” in the broadest sense of that term. But going rates are not true 
legal conventions, insofar as they are not generally accepted as binding on 
legal actors, nor are they enforceable through nonlegal sanctions. Thus, going 
rates lack political legitimacy insofar as the public is unaware of them and 
has not acquiesced. And the inability to have binding conventions creates 
distributive justice problems because, without significant means to enforce 
the going rates, defendants’ sentences vary arbitrarily. 
3. Criminal Procedure 
The most serious harms of the gap between de facto and doctrinal law 
occur not in substantive criminal law, but in criminal procedure. As Stuntz 
observed, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm in policing criminal procedure 
has had the perverse effect of causing legislatures to water down substantive 
criminal law requirements.484 Traffic offenses are a paradigmatic example. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that police need some justification to 
detain a driver,485 the Court has held that police may satisfy that burden if 
they have probable cause to believe that the driver has committed any traffic 
offense.486 This gives police significant discretion to detain drivers for 
conduct that is customarily tolerated (and for which the police probably will 
not issue a violation anyway)—authority that police use to fish for more 
serious wrongdoing.487 In one case, for example, police pre-planned to detain 
a suspected drug dealer once he exceeded the speed limit by a single mile per 
hour.488 
Overbroad criminal law has two effects on criminal procedure and one 
effect on civil redress. First, it narrows the effective scope of the exclusionary 
rule. Police may justify detentions, and even arrests, by showing objective 
probable cause that the defendant fits within some offense, however broadly 
defined or however minor.489 “Subjective intentions,” the Court held, “play 
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”490 Second, 
broader statutes reduce the prosecution’s burden of proof if a case goes to 
trial. To borrow Richman and Stuntz’s example, it is easier to show that Al 
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Capone did not pay his taxes than it is to prove his involvement in organized 
criminal activity.491 Third, with respect to civil law, overbroad criminal laws 
disable civil remedies for police misconduct. If an officer has probable cause 
that a person has committed an offense, he will have a defense to a tort action 
arising either under state law for false imprisonment or malicious 
prosecution, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. And in § 1983 actions, courts look again to “objective good 
faith,” not to the officer’s subjective motivations.492 
Overbroad criminal law—especially as it relates to traffic offenses—
heavily drives racially-disparate policing. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has 
reported that “[b]eing a driver in a traffic stop [is] the most common form of 
police-initiated contact.”493 African-American drivers are more likely to be 
stopped by police than other racial groups.494 Even outside of vehicles, police 
stop African Americans at higher rates.495 And these stops are significant 
because they allow police to fish for more serious wrongdoing—indeed, the 
stops themselves may be just a pretext to fish.496 Prosecutors exercise 
significant discretion at the investigative stage, when police choose whom to 
investigate and how.497 Prosecutors, however, cannot prosecute offenses that 
they do not know about.498 Broad statutes, thus, increase exposure to the 
criminal justice system, even when police and prosecutors do not intend to 
enforce them standing alone. 
More broadly, there are serious procedural problems with how we 
handle misdemeanor and petty-offense prosecutions. Our misdemeanor 
system is (to borrow Brown’s phrase) “different and worse”499 from how we 
handle serious offenses. Defendants often lack the right to counsel and the 
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right to trial by jury.500 Although defendants have these rights for serious 
misdemeanors,501 they may be ineffective. Many defendants cannot afford 
bail, and for them, pleading guilty may be their only means to escape long 
pretrial detention.502 And prosecutors often lobby legislatures against 
adequately funding public defenders.503 Without the pressures created by a 
system of checks, prosecutors often screen charges cursorily, if at all.504 In 
jurisdictions that keep track of prosecution decisions, it appears that 
prosecutors decline felony cases at substantially higher rates than 
misdemeanor cases.505 
This leads to problematic results. Although misdemeanor convictions 
may lack the collateral consequences of felony convictions, they can still 
have long-lasting effects. Defendants face subsequent burdens caused by 
paying off fines, violating probation, and having suspended driver’s 
licenses.506 And more misdemeanor arrests also lead to more felony arrests. 
As with traffic offenses, police use misdemeanor arrests as a pretext to search 
for more serious wrongdoing.507 So, uneven enforcement of misdemeanor 
crimes facilitates uneven enforcement of felonies. 
B. CLOSING THESE GAPS 
How can criminal law address the problems identified in the previous 
Section? In this Section, I argue that criminal law reform efforts should look 
toward conventional law and provide ways to indirectly enforce community 
norms. This Section has two subsections. 
Subsection One will look theoretically at different approaches that 
courts can take with respect to incorporating legal conventions. These 
approaches are to ignore the conventions entirely, to incorporate them as 
binding law, or to incorporate them indirectly. I argue that courts should 
adopt the third approach. 
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Subsection Two then applies that approach to several of the remaining 
problems identified in Section A. Instead of statutory reform, the imposition 
of democratically-accountable checks on criminal justice actors may 
ameliorate many of these deficiencies in criminal law. Most of the individual 
policy proposals are not novel. My hope, instead, is to give them a coherent 
theoretical grounding and to reframe their justification. These proposals 
promote criminal law conventions through the creation and indirect 
enforcement of criminal law norms. Viewed in this way, these proposals—
especially reinvigorating the power of juries—should not be viewed as 
inviting lawless equitable exceptions to criminal law; to the contrary, they 
promote the rule of law by tailoring broad statutes to the community’s shared, 
present understanding of proper criminalization and punishment. 
1. Formal Legal Rules and Conventional Criminal Law 
In Conventions in Court, Vermeule explains three approaches that 
courts can take vis-à-vis legal conventions. First, courts can ignore the 
existence of conventions. Second, they can directly enforce them by treating 
them as an explicit part of the law. Third, they can recognize the existence of 
the conventions but enforce them indirectly.508 Here, I will argue for a 
version of Vermeule’s third option: legal actors—not just courts—should 
facilitate the indirect enforcement of criminal law conventions. Some 
separation between de facto and statutory criminal law is inherent in our 
system because legislatures must draft and amend statutes under nonideal 
conditions, including limited legislative time, counter-majoritarian vetogates 
in the legislative process, and lack of political consensus among those 
responsible for drafting the criminal law. Courts and legislatures should 
embrace criminal law conventions as a way to provide legitimacy and 
democratic responsiveness to criminal law under these nonideal conditions. 
a. The Classical Approach 
The first possibility that Vermeule identifies is what he labels “the 
classical approach” or “[t]he classical Diceyan view.” Under that view, 
courts enforce only formal sources of law, such as statutes and common law. 
Conventions are not “law,” which means that remedies for the violations of 
conventions belong solely to the political process.509 
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In criminal law, the Diceyan approach may be best represented by 
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Yates v. United States.510 Yates involved a 
fisherman caught with undersized grouper in federal waters.511 At that time, 
federal law required groupers to be more than twenty inches long, but Yates 
was caught with seventy-two fish between 18.75- and 20-inches long. The 
officer issued a citation for the fish, placed the undersized fish in separate 
crates, and ordered Yates to transport them back to shore.512 By the time 
Yates returned to shore, he had dumped the undersized fish back into the 
ocean.513 The Government charged Yates with violating the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 by destroying a “tangible object” that impeded a government 
investigation.514 
The Government’s prosecution under Sarbanes-Oxley was excessive. 
The fishing violation was a noncriminal violation; Yates faced either a civil 
fine or an administrative suspension of his fishing license.515 But Yates faced 
up to twenty years in prison for the Sarbanes-Oxley charge, an offense 
created after the Enron scandal to combat those covering up accounting 
fraud.516 
Justice Kagan’s dissent recognized the real issues in the case: 
“overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S. Code.”517 This 
Sarbanes-Oxley provision was “a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, 
with too-high maximum penalties, which gives prosecutors too much 
leverage and sentencers too much discretion.” She also recognized that this 
statute was “not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal 
criminal code.”518 
But for Justice Kagan, none of this context had any legal significance. 
For her, the fish was a tangible object, so Yates’s offense fell within the plain 
text of the statute.519 As a judge, that was all she was authorized to decide.520 
Congress, not judges, bore sole responsibility for fixing 
overcriminalization.521 Justice Kagan’s opinion was a dissent, of course. But 
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there are plenty of majority opinions in which courts have thrown up their 
hands in the face of overcriminalization, declaring it to be a legislative 
problem.522 That the Sarbanes-Oxley provision was overbroad was a political 
problem, which the judiciary was not competent to resolve as an interpreter 
of law. 
In the realm of criminal law, the Diceyan approach has little to 
commend. Presumably, its chief benefit is that it promotes democratic 
legitimacy of criminal law by vesting the power to shape criminal law in a 
legislature accountable to the voters. But that is not, of course, the reality. As 
Stuntz recognized, legislatures pass broad and vague criminal laws, which 
can shift the de facto criminal lawmaking to prosecutors.523 Preventing 
criminal law from becoming the law of prosecutors requires adequate checks 
on prosecutorial power. A court’s failure to facilitate checks and balances is 
itself an important structural decision to facilitate executive primacy. 
b. Direct Enforcement 
The second approach, direct incorporation, brings conventions within 
the formal legal system. Under this approach, conventions are 
“straightforwardly judicially enforceable in whatever ways, and to the extent 
that, other sources of law are judicially enforceable.”524 Judicial enforcement 
may occur in two ways. Judges may enforce conventions directly by holding 
that the conventions “generat[e] a legal obligation without the presence of a 
separate legal rule which is being interpreted or applied.”525 Or judges may 
indirectly enforce conventions by using them to construe statutes and other 
formal sources of law when those formal sources are indeterminate.526 My 
argument here will focus on the direct enforcement approach. 
As explained above, a few American jurisdictions include some legal 
conventions as part of their formal criminal law. Four states allow judges to 
dismiss de minimis offenses when, for example, a person’s conduct did not 
create the harm sought to be prevented by the statute.527 Ordinarily, this 
would be solely an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. West Virginia courts 
also may declare certain statutory crimes desuetudinal. 
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In Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Printz, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized a desuetude defense 
to criminal violations.528 The case involved a noncriminal disciplinary 
proceeding against an attorney alleging that the attorney unethically 
demanded that his client’s alleged victim return nearly $400,000 in 
embezzled funds; in exchange, the attorney promised that his client would 
not file embezzlement charges with police.529 A predicate issue was whether 
the attorney had violated an archaic West Virginia statute that prohibited 
compounding crimes.530 The statute contained no defense for victims who 
sought only restitution under a claim of right.531 
The court held that West Virginia’s statute was unconstitutional “to the 
extent that it prohibits a victim or his agent from seeking restitution in lieu 
of a criminal prosecution” because the offense was desuetudinal in those 
circumstances.532 Analogizing to void for vagueness doctrine, the court 
explained that “a law prohibiting some act that has not given rise to a real 
prosecution in 20 years is unfair to the one person selectively prosecuted 
under it.”533 Although ultimately grounding its holding in constitutional due 
process, the court’s analytical framework for desuetude was based on Roman 
customary law.534 The court said that a malum prohibitum crime may become 
desuetudinal where there are “open, notorious, and pervasive violation[s] of 
the statute for a long period” and a “conspicuous policy of 
nonenforcement”535—which the court believed had happened to the crime of 
compounding, at least where the victim seeks only restitution. Thus, unlike 
the classical approach, the direct incorporation approach makes customs a 
binding part of the legal system. 
The argument for direct enforcement of legal conventions is stronger in 
criminal law than it is in constitutional law. In the constitutional realm, 
Vermeule objected that conventions could produce undemocratic and 
normatively bad equilibria, which democratic majorities would be powerless 
to overturn.536 Criminal law conventions arguably avoid these pitfalls. Many 
of the institutions that drive criminal law conventions—legislative oversight 
of executive enforcement, electoral accountability of prosecutors, and the 
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threat of jury trials, among others—provide democratic accountability. So, 
criminal law norms may be less “democratically suspect” than their 
constitutional counterparts.537 And if bad conventions result, citizens can 
overturn them through ordinary statutory means.538 For example, if a local 
district attorney unreasonably refuses to prosecute a certain class of offenses, 
the state can vest the power in other prosecutors539 or Congress can 
intervene.540 Overturning constitutional conventions, in contrast, may require 
a constitutional amendment. 
Despite these advantages, there are still good reasons for courts to avoid 
direct enforcement of conventions. First, courts may legitimately worry that 
direct enforcement threatens separation of powers.541 Epps argues that formal 
separation of powers is unnecessary and insufficient to protect individual 
liberty in the face of the criminal justice system.542 I agree. But the formal 
separation of powers is still part of our constitutional system. A judiciary that 
arrogates for itself the power to override criminal law would be acting as a 
super-legislature, thereby undermining the coherence of our system. The rule 
of law requires that judges respect a particular legal system’s internal legal 
rules. 
Direct enforcement may also create instrumental problems by inhibiting 
the evolution of criminal law. Conventions often change when someone 
violates them and that violation gains acceptance.543 Breaches of convention 
may be normatively important to fix bad conventions. For example, it may 
have been the custom to ignore domestic violence as a “family issue.”544 If 
courts had directly incorporated the convention, that custom would have been 
a legally recognized exception, thereby requiring the legislature to pass a new 
statute to punish domestic violence. The same goes for white violence against 
African Americans in the South. No matter how much a society informally 
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tolerated it at one time, we would not have wanted such conventions to ossify 
into formal law, changeable only through legislation. In the case of racial 
violence, duplicative federal criminalization permitted the federal 
government to destroy pernicious local conventions.545 Once destroyed, local 
jurisdictions then had the power, without further legislation, to apply the laws 
against violence evenly. 
Allowing conventional change also encourages criminal law 
conventions to adapt to changing times. Take draft registration. A military 
draft appears to be a remote possibility, and there has been little support to 
see U.S. Attorneys prosecute hundreds of thousands of young men who do 
not register.546 But if there were a largescale armed conflict necessitating the 
draft, we may want prosecutors to be able to enforce the draft registration 
laws.547 Judicial enforcement of contemporary conventions risks ossifying 
conventions in suboptimal ways.548 
c. Judicial Recognition and Indirect Enforcement 
The third option is that the judiciary may recognize conventions, even 
while they do not directly enforce them.549 The lack of direct enforcement 
means that “conventions are not to be enforced by courts as freestanding 
obligations.”550 But courts may nevertheless recognize and consider criminal 
law conventions in their decisions in two ways. 
First, judges may indirectly enforce specific conventions. In indirect 
enforcement, judges enforce a convention “because of its connection with a 
distinct legal right.”551 Conventions may provide necessary background and 
context “to clarify the meaning of statutes.”552 Or, outside of statutory 
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interpretation, judges may enforce criminal law conventions by using 
procedural rules to deter prosecutions outside of commonly accepted 
limits.553 
Second, judges may account for criminal law conventions by treating 
the system itself as conventional. At this macro level, judges do not enforce 
conventions related to particular crimes. But they do strive to maintain the 
conventional system. Judges do this by facilitating checks and balances554 
and, more specifically, the kinds of checks that encourage the criminal law 
to adapt to democratic preferences. 
Take Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the 
independent counsel statute.555 The first four parts of Justice Scalia’s dissent 
concerned separation of powers. He argued that Congress may not shield 
independent counsel against Presidential removal because the Constitution 
vests purely executive power in the President alone.556 But Part V of the 
opinion switched from a discussion of separation of powers to one 
concerning checks on prosecutorial abuse. Quoting Justice Jackson, Justice 
Scalia explained that “[w]ith the law books filled with a great assortment of 
crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical 
violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, . . . it is a 
question of picking the man and then searching the law books . . . .”557 
Because prosecutors have enormous formal legal power, Justice Scalia 
continued, “the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one,” 
and thus it is necessary to have prosecutors who can be removed by an elected 
official accountable to the people.558 
At the macro level, this is the quintessential way in which judges take 
account of the conventional nature of criminal law. Unlike the dissent in 
Yates (which Justice Scalia ironically joined), Justice Scalia’s answer in 
Morrison was not for the executive branch to seek legislative reform cabining 
the number of substantive crimes. That was water under the bridge. Instead, 
Justice Scalia recognized the need for nonlegal checks against prosecutors to 
cabin the de facto scope of substantive criminal law.559 And one way in which 
the judiciary could facilitate nonlegal checks is by prohibiting Congress from 
 
 553 See, e.g., United States v. Abair, 746 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 554 See Epps, supra note 542 (giving a theoretical account of checks and balances in 
criminal law and providing doctrinal implications). 
 555 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988). 
 556 Id. at 699–727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 557 Id. at 728 (quoting Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the 
Second Annual Conference of the United States Attorneys, Apr. 1, 1940). 
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 559 See id. at 727–32. 
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shielding individual prosecutors from removal by politically accountable 
officers. 
The political accountability of prosecutors is just one example.560 I will 
offer some other examples in the next subsection, especially as they relate to 
trial by jury. Both electoral accountability and trial by jury are important not 
just because they provide checks in the abstract, but because they provide 
democratic checks on substantive criminal law. The examples in the 
following subsection also recognize that criminal law conventions are not 
directly analogous to their constitutional law counterparts. Violations of 
constitutional conventions are high-information events. People will notice 
when an elector is faithless or, in Britain, if the Queen vetoes a bill. Criminal 
law conventions are different. Most people will not notice if police ticket a 
random person for going one mile per hour above the speed limit, if police 
arrest someone for a hypertechnical criminal violation, or if a prosecutor 
significantly overcharges a person for a minor violation. Structurally, we 
need checks that deter low-information deviations and encourage prosecutors 
to shape their charging decisions around societal norms. 
2. Harnessing Conventions to Correct for Overcriminalization’s Problems 
In this section, I will offer some policy proposals to correct 
contemporary overcriminalization problems. These include, among others, 
to give the jury more power over sentencing defendants, to reinvigorate the 
executive clemency process, to provide more transparency in criminal law 
enforcement, and to have courts consider an officer’s subjective good faith 
when making detentions and arrests for offenses that are not customarily 
enforced. The basic theme of these proposals is that legal actors should seek 
to develop and preserve unwritten conventions as a necessary supplement to 
statutory criminal law. 
a. Prosecutorial Discretion over Guilty Defendants 
Outside of overcriminalization’s effect on criminal procedure 
(discussed below), perhaps the most serious overcriminalization problem is 
that prosecutors have enormous power over those who are guilty of breaching 
societal norms.561 Comparatively few criminal cases today go to trial. 
 
 560 It is unclear whether Justice Scalia thought the political accountability of prosecutors 
was sufficient for checking expansive criminal law. Justice Scalia also joined Justice Kagan’s 
dissent in Yates, which suggested that overcriminalization was a problem for Congress, not 
the courts. Or perhaps Justice Scalia saw the conventional nature of criminal law more acutely 
when prosecutors went after executive branch officials than he did when prosecutors charged 
private defendants. 
 561 Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization, supra note 30, at 463. 
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Prosecutors and defendants resolve the overwhelming majority through plea 
bargains.562 And when a defendant has committed a blameworthy act (not 
just a technical statutory violation), redundant and overlapping criminal 
provisions give prosecutors leverage.563 Prosecutors can dictate sentencing 
outcomes by deciding what crimes are charged and which facts go into the 
plea—for example, whether the drugs were of a certain weight, a firearm was 
carried, or a recidivist statute applies. Out of respect for separation of powers, 
courts have refused to review prosecutorial charging decisions, absent the 
most flagrant forms of abuse.564 And individual sentencing recommendations 
tend to be low-information events in which political pressure will not cabin 
prosecutorial abuse.565 
One method to combat unreasonable charging decisions by prosecutors 
would be to further empower juries. Judges, first, can inform jurors about a 
defendant’s possible sentence exposure, including the maximum possible 
sentence and any mandatory minimums. In Yates, for example, the judge 
could have informed the jury that the defendant faced up to twenty years in 
prison for throwing the fish overboard.566 Appellate courts have routinely 
held that district courts are not obligated to inform juries about the relative 
sentencing ranges.567 But, except for a recent Second Circuit decision,568 they 
have not held that courts inherently abuse their discretion by providing jurors 
with this information.569 
Providing the jury with sentencing information is not inherently 
tantamount to endorsing nullification. At trial, defendants may offer defenses 
that are implausible but not frivolous. A jury that knows the full 
consequences of its decision may have different perceptions about what 
constitutes reasonable doubt or how to apply a vague element of the 
offense.570 Jurors would probably insist on more certainty before putting 
someone to death than they would if the offense were as serious as a traffic 
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violation.571 Because the harshness of the sentence may influence how juries 
perceives reasonable doubt, prosecutors may be more likely to drop harsh 
mandatory minimums in cases where they may not be appropriate by either 
charging a less-serious crime with a correspondingly less-serious sentence or 
by not bringing charges at all. 
Although giving the jury sentencing information is not inherently a 
license to nullify, a little jury nullification may not be a bad thing. Jurors have 
traditionally played this role, most famously when undervaluing stolen goods 
to prevent thieves from receiving the death penalty.572 Judges can facilitate a 
similar kind of “pious perjury”573 with harsh recidivist provisions. Recidivist 
statutes amplify punishments, often by many multiples for drug and gun 
offenders.574 Yet, despite Apprendi, which expanded the Sixth Amendment 
jury trial right to most sentencing enhancements, defendants charged under 
recidivist statutes have no right to trial by jury on whether they were 
previously convicted.575 Just like eighteenth-century jurors would 
undervalue property, juries might be unwilling to convict under recidivist 
statutes if they are told they must find that a person was previously convicted. 
Indeed, it appears that under the formerly-binding Sentencing Guidelines,576 
judges frequently did this on their own.577 
Detractors will object that empowering jurors in these ways encourages 
lawless juries. But the lawlessness objection is based on a mistaken 
perspective that statutory law is our criminal law, and that to acquit in the 
face of technical guilt is to allow an acquittal against the law. In actuality, we 
know that de facto criminal law is narrower than statutory criminal law,578 
and that sentencing enhancements (as with criminal statutes more broadly) 
can be inappropriately applied to trivial instantiations of wrongdoing.579 
Allowing the jury to know a defendant’s sentencing exposure provides a 
check whereby the community can judge whether the prosecutor has acted 
lawlessly by overcharging particular cases. That is, juries can refuse to 
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endorse the actions of prosecutors who act technically within statutes but 
outside the commonly accepted criminal law conventions. 
For cases that do not go to trial, prosecutors should have to disclose to 
the public their “going rates” for plea bargains. Disclosure will confer several 
advantages over the present system. First, it will ameliorate some of the 
information advantage that repeat players have within a courthouse.580 
Second, publication of the information will deter prosecutors from deviating 
in isolated cases.581 Third, publication will also subject the going rates to 
democratic legitimacy. Most prosecutors are elected, and the actual expected 
sentences for crimes are a core criminal justice issue that should be the 
subject of popular oversight through elections. Even though prosecutorial 
elections are low-information events, the availability of this information 
would alert the public to substantial deviations from popular norms and deter 
prosecutors from setting popularly unacceptable going rates.582 Here again, 
the goal is to develop legal conventions that have popular legitimacy and the 
real threat of indirect sanctions for violating them. 
b. Developing Conventions to Cabin Statutory Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences and to Reduce the Need for Congress to Pass Such 
Sentencing Laws 
A robust system of checks and balances can also ameliorate the 
problems created by excessively harsh mandatory minimum sentences. In 
addition to providing greater jury participation, the criminal law can cabin 
excessively harsh sentences by reinvigorating the clemency process. Pardons 
and commutations were among the traditional remedies for excessively harsh 
statutory sentences.583 Today, clemency is rare. Except for President 
Obama’s grant of clemency to some drug offenders at the end of his second 
term, most years see, at most, a few dozen people pardoned and a handful of 
commutations.584 The virtual unavailability of clemency can work significant 
injustice in cases where prosecutors have overcharged crimes and in marginal 
cases where Congress’s statutory penalties are too harsh given the facts. 
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The causes of dysfunction in the clemency process are primarily 
political: for most politicians, the risk is asymmetric. As the infamous Willie 
Horton ad showed, politicians can face significant public backlash for 
providing leniency, if someone later reoffends.585 In contrast, the refusal to 
give clemency has little political cost, and those most affected often cannot 
vote.586 
In part, reform should look to provide executives with political cover. 
Courts can play a more active role in suggesting clemency. In cases where 
statutory sentences are too harsh, nothing prevents courts from sending 
recommendations to the Pardon Attorney that the President should 
immediately commute the sentence to something more reasonable. Such 
procedures were routinely used by English judges.587 A judge’s 
recommendation to commute an unreasonable sentence may also give the 
President or a Governor some political cover in case the defendant reoffends 
in the future. Some have proposed creating a clemency commission.588 The 
existence of such a commission could also help the executive diffuse 
responsibility when someone reoffends. In the federal system, Congress 
should also create some separation between the clemency process and the 
Department of Justice. The current organizational structure—in which 
responsibility for mitigating harsh results is vested in the same department 
that prosecuted the case—is inherently a conflict of interest. As such, the 
Pardon Attorney’s office should be removed from the Department of Justice. 
Legislatures and judges might also reduce the need for mandatory 
minimums by dividing sentencing responsibility. Legislatures often pass 
mandatory minimums to prevent idiosyncratic judges from issuing 
inappropriately low sentences.589 The problem is more acute where judges 
lack accountability to the electorate.590 Dividing sentencing responsibility 
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may help prevent inappropriately low sentences issued by single trial judges, 
thereby reducing the incentive to have mandatory minimum sentences. One 
method may be to solicit the jury, as representatives of the community, to see 
what they believe to be the appropriate sentence.591 And juror participation 
may prevent excessive harshness, too. In at least one judge’s experience, 
“Every time I ever went back in the jury room and asked the jurors to write 
down what they thought would be an appropriate sentence . . . every time—
even here, in one of the most conservative parts of Iowa, where we haven’t 
had a ‘not guilty’ verdict in seven or eight years—they would recommend a 
sentence way below the guidelines sentence.”592 The use of a multimember 
jury—as opposed to a single judge—can cabin the effects of idiosyncratic 
preferences and mistaken perceptions. 
c. Misdemeanor Practice 
I do not purport to offer a full slate of reforms for misdemeanor justice. 
Code reform may help a little; some misdemeanors (e.g., marijuana 
possession) no longer involve conduct that society generally condemns. And 
code reform can help correct other overcriminalization problems, such as the 
power to use technical offenses to expand law enforcement’s search and 
seizure authority.593 Even when officers do not care about the underlying 
misdemeanor, the existence of such offenses can serve as a gateway to fish 
for more serious crimes.594 
But code reform alone cannot fix the misdemeanor system because the 
core of prosecuted misdemeanors and petty offenses also involve conduct 
that society does condemn—driving under the influence, theft, vandalism, 
trespass, disorderly conduct, weapons violations, and the like.595 Going 
beyond code reform, the goal of misdemeanor reform should be to develop a 
conventional law of misdemeanor crime that complements our statutory 
system. This can be done by facilitating checks on police and prosecutors. In 
part, this will involve removing barriers to presently existing checks. Setting 
high cash bail and inadequately funding public defenders, for example, gives 
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prosecutors inordinate leverage over indigent defendants.596 Even in our 
system of plea bargaining, prosecutors shape their charging decisions around 
expected trial outcomes.597 But the threat of going to trial will not discipline 
prosecutors when they know that defendants will have to pay a heavy price 
to exercise their rights. 
d. Discouraging Arbitrary Enforcement 
Criminal law conventions are different from constitutional conventions 
because law enforcement officials may make occasional deviations from 
criminal law conventions without incurring significant nonlegal obstacles. 
For example, even if nearly all drivers can drive within five or ten miles per 
hour of the speed limit with impunity, police ticket a few such drivers each 
year.598 In these cases, the law seems to be defined by statute, not by 
convention. This reflects the fact that most criminal prosecutions are low-
information events,599 a fortiori, when the offense is a misdemeanor or an 
infraction. Arbitrary enforcement of statutes creates significant rule-of-law 
problems, particularly when that enforcement may be in violation of 
customary norms. 
Here, the legislature and the executive branch may take steps to promote 
the rule of law. Because conventions depend on nonlegal means for their 
enforcement, increasing transparency in law enforcement aids in applying 
political sanctions when actors breach criminal law conventions. To continue 
with the speeding ticket example, it would be helpful to know who and why 
officers ticketed for minor speeding. One can think of many legitimate and 
customary reasons for these tickets. Perhaps these individuals were, in fact, 
going significantly faster, but the officer wrote the ticket as if the driver were 
just above the limit to reduce the fine. Or perhaps they were driving at an 
unsafe speed through a school zone. Alternatively, one can think of more 
problematic reasons, such as pretextual stops (e.g., because the person was 
suspected of a drug violation) or just being arbitrarily selected by police. The 
fact that forty drivers in Virginia received a speeding ticket in 2018 for 
driving less than five miles per hour above the speed limit may not be a 
significant political event to change police practices. But if the data reveal 
troubling trends about who are selected and why, that could provide the 
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necessary political impetus for correction.600 Legislatures can also require 
police and prosecutors to disclose their office policies for enforcing the law. 
If a prosecutor’s office has a policy to decline marijuana possession cases, 
that decision has a de facto legal effect in that jurisdiction. The publication 
of such policies may make it more difficult to maintain isolated and arbitrary 
prosecutions. In a conventional system, the principal cabining of power 
comes through effective nonlegal checks on the arbitrary enforcement of 
statutes.601 
e. Criminal Procedure and Pretext 
Some of the worst effects of statutory overcriminalization concern its 
effects on criminal procedure.602 Acknowledging that unwritten conventions 
form part of criminal law may help alleviate some of these problems. For 
example, courts might require subjective good faith to justify a search or 
seizure when the police only have probable cause that a person has 
committed an offense that is ordinarily within the customary tolerance of 
society, such as driving one mile per hour above the speed limit.603 A similar 
rule might also apply in civil cases, which would give civil juries more power 
to remedy pretextual stops. 
The Court’s recent decision in Nieves v. Bartlett heads in this 
direction.604 The case involved a § 1983 claim alleging that officers arrested 
the plaintiff for disorderly conduct as retaliation for the plaintiff’s exercise 
of his First Amendment rights.605 The Court held that, in general, a plaintiff 
in a retaliatory prosecution case must “plead and prove the absence of 
probable cause for the underlying criminal charge.”606 But concerned that 
police could justify an arrest by providing probable cause of any statutory 
violation, including those such as jaywalking that rarely result in arrest, the 
Court also held that “the no-probable-cause requirement should not apply 
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when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when 
otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of 
protected speech had not been.”607 This exception recognizes that we have a 
common law of crime, which is narrower than the statutes on the books. 
An effort to inject more subjective good faith into the Fourth 
Amendment and civil actions come at significant cost for police. In Whren, 
the Supreme Court said, “[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us 
to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly 
violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the 
lawfulness of enforcement.”608 But judges, no less than other members of the 
community, have general knowledge about the norms of how laws are 
enforced. And this approach facilitates symmetry between police and the 
community. The community knows that statutory criminal law is overbroad; 
to navigate this, individuals have to have some sense about what are the “real 
crimes” and what technical crimes fall within customary tolerance. The 
police should be held to the same standard in their enforcement decisions. 
Thus, courts should examine charges with more scrutiny when law 
enforcement officers stop or arrest someone for offenses that widely come 
within customary social tolerances, such as trivial speeding. 
These proposed solutions do not solve all externalities caused by 
overcriminalization. Stuntz is correct that broader crimes dilute the burden 
of proof at trial,609 and I am not sure there is a great answer to that problem. 
For certain statutory omissions (e.g., absence of a mens rea requirement), 
courts can continue to apply the normal rules of statutory construction and 
infer stricter statutory requirements. And as many commentators have called 
for, courts also can use the ordinary tools of statutory construction—
especially clear statement rules and the rule of lenity—to curb the scope of 
statutes.610 More rigorous statutory review will deter prosecutors from 
bringing cases that the statute was not designed to reach. And when judges 
narrow the scope of ambiguous statutes, they shift the burden back to the 
legislature to decide whether certain marginal cases should, in fact, be 
criminalized. 
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But more aggressive approaches to interpreting statutes will lead the 
judiciary to exercise too much power to redraft statutes. That cure may be 
worse than the disease. It may be that we have to rely on the other actors in 
the criminal justice system to ensure that prosecutors do not abuse relaxed 
burdens of proof. The development and recognition of criminal law 
conventions will not fix every serious problem of statutory 
overcriminalization. 
CONCLUSION 
Most accounts of contemporary American criminal law paint a 
distressing picture. Criminal codes are broad, vague, and harsh. Political 
dysfunction causes legislatures continually to add new crimes. Everyone 
violates some law—whether petty or serious—virtually every day. 
Ultimately, prosecutors are left to decide who to charge and for what, making 
them “the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”611 And federal law 
often duplicates state law but with much harsher penalties.612 The result, we 
are told, is a system of criminal justice that fails to adhere to many basic 
principles of legality. Broad and vague criminal laws fail to put people on 
notice of what conduct is criminal. These laws lack democratic legitimacy 
because broad and vague laws essentially delegate criminal lawmaking to 
prosecutors. And having duplicative federal and state criminal codes 
facilitates the disparate treatment of offenders who commit identical crimes. 
This vision of criminal law is unduly bleak. A lawless world in which 
prosecutors truly act as both lawmakers and law enforcers would look very 
different from ours. In reality, our system is fairly predictable. That is 
because a rich set of unwritten norms supplement our statutory system. 
Criminal law remains a form of conventional law. It is not the legal realist 
common law of judge-made rules, but rather an older vision of common law, 
where the law is defined by present but evolving customs. Those customs 
shape statutory law into a workable system of criminal law. They narrow 
overbroad statutes. They divide federal and state criminal law, despite their 
statutory overlap. And, perhaps most importantly, these customs shift as 
society shifts, providing legitimacy to our criminal law as it presently exists. 
These customs are the result of extensive checks and balances, which 
do exist in our criminal law. Legislatures, voters, jurors, judges, and 
redundant executive officials keep the criminal law in check. They place 
pressure to enforce the law against those who engage in blameworthy 
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conduct. And they apply pressure against enforcing statutory laws that have 
no relationship to blameworthy conduct. 
The development of common-law-like norms through checks on power 
may also provide a method of improving those areas where our modern 
criminal law has fallen short. Harsh sentencing in individual cases, arbitrary 
enforcement of misdemeanors, and arbitrary use of substantive criminal law 
to circumvent search and seizure rights have occurred in pockets where there 
are few effective checks on executive power. And the rise of mandatory 
minimum sentences occurred as a response to perceived abuses by individual 
judges, who wield enormous discretion in sentencing. Empowering juries, 
reinvigorating the clemency process, removing barriers that prevent 
misdemeanor defendants from exercising trial rights, and requiring 
subjective good faith on the part of law enforcement when they enforce laws 
more severely than the community expects may all contribute to the 
development of unwritten conventions that check the excesses technically 
allowed by statutory law. 
More basically, we should stop fretting over the state of statutory law. 
The criminal codification project promised more than it could deliver: clear 
laws, specifying specific conduct ex ante, written for all to read and learn, 
and maintained by a democratically-accountable legislature that would be 
responsive to popular shifts. But statutory laws are never perfectly drafted. 
Small errors can create large overcriminalization problems, while precise 
specification encourages bad actors to find legal loopholes. Making matters 
worse, legislatures lack the time and resources to maintain criminal codes. 
These legislative defects are not readily fixable. Fortunately, our criminal law 
is not primarily statutory. Statutes may provide the broad framework for our 
criminal law, but unwritten conventions—a kind of common law—place the 
meat on the statutory bones.613 In this system, we primarily improve our 
criminal law not by fixing statutes, but by developing and improving our 
customs and traditions. 
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